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I. INTRODUCTION
"[The Uniform Commercial Code's] liberal recognition of the needs of commerce ...
shall not be made into an instrument of abuse."
' 1
For centuries, merchants have sought to hustle the sale of their wares
speedily or sight unseen, the obvious advantage being that the buyer, in haste,
may overlook a flaw or strike a bargain on impulse, thus promoting the sale of a
good that might have otherwise been passed over or purchased for a lower price
given careful consideration, momentary reflection, or further negotiation. In
medieval Europe, merchants were known to occasionally pass off a runt--or
even the less-valued cat-as a suckling piglet at market to the unwary customer
by concealing the animal in a sling-sack, known as a "poke," and conducting the
transaction sight unseen under the pretense that opening the bag might allow the
animal to escape.2 Thus the idiom "to buy a pig in a poke" became synonymous
with making a less than fully-informed purchase.3 The victim of this grift might
not discover the folly of his purchase until returning home, where the poke
would be opened, thereby "letting the cat out of the bag.",
4
Today, states have responded to such sharp business practices by impos-
ing certain implied warranties upon the parties by operation of law. 5 Notwith-
I U.C.C. § 1-303 cmt. 9 (2004) (referring to the admissibility of evidence regarding the usage
of trade). While more than half of the states have adopted Revised Article 1 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, as of this writing, no state has adopted the latest proposed amendments to
Article 2. For this reason, when citing Uniform Commercial Code-General Provisions, this Note
refers to the 2004 amendments to Article 1, but when citing Uniform Commercial Code-Sales,
this Note refers to the 2000 version of Article 2.
2 CHARLES EARLE FUNK, A HOG ON ICE AND OTHER CURIOUS EXPRESSIONS 105-06 (1948).
3 Id.
4 Id. at 138.
5 In addition to other protections, such as state consumer protection statutes (discussed infra
Part IV), the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) imposes an implied warranty of merchantability
on all contracts for the sale of goods where the seller is a merchant, unless otherwise agreed.
U.C.C. § 2-314 (2000). The warranty of merchantability requires, among other standards, that the
goods at a minimum "pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; ... are fit
for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and ... are adequately contained, pack-
aged, and labeled as the agreement may require." Id. § 2-314(2). A "merchant" is defined as "a
person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise ... holds himself out as having knowledge or
skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction." Id. § 2-104(1). The U.C.C.
demarcates three types of merchants: merchants as to goods, merchants as to practices, and mer-
chants as to both goods and practices. Id. § 2-104 cmt. 2. Only a merchant as to goods or a mer-
chant as to both goods and practices makes the warranty of merchantability, not a merchant of the
penultimate type. Id. § 2-314(1). However, any seller making an express "guarantee" may be
obligated to provide goods that are at least "merchantable." Id. § 2-314 cmt. 4. A "consumer" is
"an individual who enters into a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purpos-
es." Id. § 1-201(b)(l1).
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standing these efforts, computer software 6 developers continue to engage in
similarly prestidigitatorial tactics to reduce potential liability for defects in their
products and to control distribution by offering their wares on a take-it-or-leave-
it basis where the buyer must arguably "consent" to the terms of a license prior
to opening the software or operating it on a computer.7 This is often accom-
plished through the use of "shrinkwrap" or "clickwrap" agreements,8 the terms
of which are not fully revealed to the buyer until after the transaction is com-
plete.
The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) provides that "[a] contract for
sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, includ-
ing conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract."9
Although software arguably differs from other types of "goods," because most
states have yet to adopt statutes specifically designed to govern software trans-
actions, the majority of courts have applied Article 2 of the U.C.C., at least by
6 As used in this Note, the term "software" is equivalent to "computer program," which is
defined under the United States Copyright Act as "a set of statements or instructions to be used
directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-122
(2005).
7 Although license terms employed by software developers typically include both disclaimers
of warranties and limitations on remedies, this Note applies the former term to describe both.
8 While there are many names given to terms presented to software users in this manner, as
used in this Note, "shrinkwrap" agreements refer to license terms "agreed to" by the user upon
opening the software packaging, regardless as to whether the basic terms are viewable prior to
breaking the packaging seal. "Box-top" licenses are distinguished from shrinkwrap agreements
only in that box-top licenses contain all of the terms of the license on the outside of the package;
therefore, the buyer may view the terms in their entirety prior to purchase, whereas shrinkwrap
agreements contain only notice, or a partial listing, of the terms on the outside of the packaging
that reference the terms contained inside the packaging (see infra note 22). "Clickwrap" (also
known as "click-through") agreements refer to license terms displayed on the computer screen
when the user installs the program or runs it for the first time. The terms are typically displayed in
a scrollable window to which the user must manifest "assent" to the terms or decline them by
moving the pointer over the appropriate response button and clicking the mouse. The program
will not launch until the "acceptance" button is selected with the pointer, but once selected, the
user is not prompted to "accept" again during subsequent use of the software.
Additionally, these types of terms will collectively be called "end user license agreements"
(EULAs) throughout this Note. Although much software is distributed via the internet through
"browsewrap" agreements, which may be either given away ("freeware"), shared for a limited
time or with limited functionality and then either bought or disabled ("shareware"), or sold direct-
ly or indirectly from its developer, this Note is primarily concerned with consumer software pur-
chased through a retailer ("canned" software). Furthermore, other variations on these types of
agreements, such as terms of use (TOU) and terms of service (TOS) exist as well, but such agree-
ments are not the focus of this Note. This Note is primarily concerned with the scenario where a
consumer purchases mass-marketed software from a "brick and mortar" store, returns home to
install the program on a home computer, and is confronted with a EULA purporting to disclaim
most or all warranties and liability concerning the software. However, to a large extent, the litiga-
tion of the underlying issues arising under shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements is common to all
software and website use agreements; therefore, the matters discussed herein are generally appli-
cable to any such set of terms.
9 U.C.C. § 2-204(1).
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analogy.' 0 In doing so, several courts have found shrinkwrap and clickwrap
terms to be binding under specific provisions of the U.C.C."l These courts
uphold the validity of shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements based either on the
U.C.C.'s promulgated predilection for the modernization and expansion of
commercial practices 2 or on the basis that the new terms modify the original
sale,' 3 are proposed additions that become part of the contract, 14 or constitute a
new "offer" to which the user "accepts" through continued use of the product.
15
However, in applying such provisions of the U.C.C. to govern software agree-
ments, these courts misconstrue the text, fail to consult the comments, and are
too oft apt to ignore those provisions that shield the buyer from obligatory am-
bush. 16
The difficulty that courts have had in deciding disputes in this area of
contract law is apparent from the inconsistent holdings among the jurisdic-
tions. 17 While two states have adopted separate laws to govern these transac-
tions, the West Virginia legislature has presumably deemed existing proposals,
such as the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), inade-
10 See, e.g., Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 675-76 (3rd Cir. 1991) ("[T]he
majority espous[es] the view that software fits within the definition of a 'good' in the U.C.C.");
RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[Services] and system
upgrading were incidental to sale of the software package and did not defeat characterization of
the system as a good."); Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1084
(C.D. Cal. 2001) ("A number of courts have held that the sale of software is the sale of a good
within the meaning of Uniform Commercial Code."); Wachter Mgmt. Co. v. Dexter & Chaney,
Inc., 144 P.3d 747, 750 (Kan. 2006) ("Computer software is considered to be goods subject to the
U.C.C. even though incidental services are provided along with the sale of the software."). For a
semi-exhaustive list of shrinkwrap and clickwrap cases, see Kevin W. Grierson, Annotation, En-
forceability of "Clickwrap" or "Shrinkwrap" Agreements Common in Computer Software,
Hardware, and Internet Transactions, 106 A.L.R. 5th 309 (2003).
1 E.g., most cases upholding the validity of shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements stem from
the holding in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), which based its decision,
at least in part, on section 2-204(1) of the U.C.C. See also M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timber-
line Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 313 (Wash. 2000) (concluding that section 2-204 of the U.C.C.
"allows the formation of 'layered contracts"').
12 U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (2004) (formerly § 1-102). See, e.g., i.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv.
Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D. Mass. 2002) (quoting the language of former § 1-102
of the U.C.C.).
13 Id. § 2-209.
14 Id. § 2-207.
15 Id. § 2-206 (acceptance "shall be construed ... in any manner and by any medium reasona-
ble under the circumstances"); ("Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer... fails to make an
effective rejection ... [after] a reasonable opportunity to inspect them .... ). See, e.g., ProCD,
86 F.3d at 1452 ("A buyer accepts goods under § 2-606(1)(b) when, after an opportunity to in-
spect, he fails to make an effective rejection under § 2-602(1).").
16 "The text of each section should be read in the light of the purpose and policy of the rule or
principle in question, as also of the Uniform Commercial Code, as a whole .... " U.C.C. § 1-103
cmt. 1 (emphasis added).
17 See infra Part II.
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quate to protect consumers from overreaching by software developers (which
occupy superior positions of bargaining power), thus indicating a propensity
toward consumer rights.' 8 However, the stance that the West Virginia courts
will adopt apropos of the issue has yet to be determined.' 9 Therefore, an exami-
nation of this developing area of contract law under the lens of existing West
Virginia decisions and statutes may be useful in crafting a litigation strategy
until the matter is disposed of by the West Virginia courts or a consensus can be
reached among the states.
This Note examines the validity of warranty and liability disclaimers in
consumer transactions regarding shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements, and
discusses litigation strategies in this field under West Virginia law. Part II of
this Note discusses the current treatment of shrinkwrap and clickwrap agree-
ments under existing law in jurisdictions outside of West Virginia to provide a
18 As of this writing, only Maryland and Virginia have adopted a body of law that specifically
addresses shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements, known as UCITA (see infra Part IV). However,
West Virginia has explicitly rejected UCITA, and has even passed "bomb shelter" legislation to
protect its residents and businesses from this uniform act. W. VA. CODE § 55-8-15 (2001). See
infra Part IV.C.1. This legislation was drafted, ii part, by the Americans for Fair Electronic
Commerce Transactions (AFFECT), a non-profit coalition "formed to defeat attempts to pass ...
UCITA." See http://affect.ucita.compdflUCITABombShelter.pdf and http://www.ucita.coml
who.html, respectively (both last visited Feb. 8, 2008). See also, H. WARD CLASSEN, A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SOFrWARE LICENSING FOR LICENSEES AND LICENSORS 162 (2nd ed. 2007);
Robin C. Capehart & Mark A. Starcher, "Wired, Wonderful West Virginia "-Electronic Signa-
tures in the Mountain State, 104 W. VA. L. REv. 303, 340 (2002) ("This provision, which has been
adopted in other states, is a reaction to the perceived 'procompany' slant of the UCITA.").
19 In Schultz v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 685 (N.D. W. Va. 2005), the
court, in obiter dictum (and as such, the statement carries no precedential value), agreed with the
finding in ProCD, that "terms inside a box of software could bind consumers who use the soft-
ware after being given an opportunity to read and reject the terms and return the item." Id. at 691
(citing ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447). Finding that the plaintiff accepted the terms of an arbitration
clause in consideration for "a promotional contract and a discounted phone" through activation
and continued use of the phone and service, and that the provision was conscionable, the court
held the arbitration clause to be legally enforceable. Id. at 692. However, contract law is general-
ly established by the state; therefore, West Virginia courts are not bound by Schultz, except with
respect to questions of federal law. See discussions on the Copyright Act, infra Part II and the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), infra Part IV.
It should be noted that the predominant purpose of a wireless telephone contract is the pro-
vision of services, not goods. As evidence of this, many service providers offer free phones in
exchange for the consumer's agreement to a enter into a service contract, the monthly billing rate
for which often exceeds the price of the phone (even where the latter is purchased separately), and
most service contracts continue by their terms for at least a year. Furthermore, the complaint in
Shultz arose "from a wireless telephone service contract," whereby the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant breached by "unlawfully withdrawing funds from his bank account," thus the gravamen
of the complaint was based on the service aspect of the transaction, which had nothing to do with
the goods themselves. Id. at 687 (emphasis added). Because the "contract" in ProCD could only
be formed under U.C.C. principles applying to goods (see infra Part IV.A.1), the allusion to
ProCD in the Shultz opinion was inappropriate. "The danger of undisciplined dicta is that lawyers
and nisi prius judges may take it seriously." Pittsburgh Elevator v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 310
S.E.2d 675, 690 (W. Va. 1983) (Neely, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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brief history of the reasons such agreements were created and how the courts
have dealt with them, as well as to illustrate the inconsistencies and difficulties
courts have struggled with in coming to terms with an economic force that out-
paces the common law's ability to adapt. Part III explores terms common to
shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements, pointing out a few of the more egregious
terms employed by software developers to later illustrate, in Part IV, how a
proper application of the U.C.C. and West Virginia law might avert their validi-
ty in the consumer context while providing a fair playing field that not only bal-
ances the interests of the parties, but those of society at large. Part IV provides
litigation strategies under West Virginia law in the event that West Virginia
courts determine such terms to be valid and enforceable.
II. Treatment of Software Under Existing Law
In the beginning, software developers sought to avoid the first sale doc-
trine20 by licensing their programs rather than transferring ownership in them to
purchasers. 21 This was initially achieved through the use of "box-top" licenses,
the precursor to the modem day end user license agreement (EULA).22 Courts
generally accepted the software developer's designation of the nature of the
transaction "without much examination. 2 3 The rationale adopted by the courts
early in the development of this area of law was that the speed and ease with
which one could duplicate software would destroy the economic incentive to
create it if third parties were permitted to rent software to consumers, because
consumers would simply rent and copy the software rather than purchase it.24
Although doing so would be illegal, as copyright infringement, enforcement
against individual consumers would be costly and difficult. "Thus, software
producers wanted to sue the companies that were renting the copies of the pro-
gram to individual consumers, rather than the individual consumers [them-
selves] ...[b]y characterizing the original transaction between the software
producer and the software rental company as a license, rather than a sale. 25 In
making the license exclusive and non-transferable, "software producers hoped
20 The first sale doctrine entitles the owner of a lawful copy of a copyrighted work "to sell or
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy" freely. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2005).
21 Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., Inc., 939 F.2d 91, 96 n.7 (3rd Cir. 1991).
22 A box-top license typically "provides that the customer has not purchased the software
itself, but has merely obtained a personal, non-transferable license to use the program." Id. See
supra note 8. The box-top license was generally succeeded by the shrinkwrap license due to
increasingly complex license terms, which prevented software companies from being able to fit
the entire set of terms on the outside of the software packaging.
23 Christian H. Nadan, Software Licensing in the 21st Century: Are Software "Licenses" Real-
ly Sales, and How Will the Software Industry Respond?, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 555, 591 (2006).
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to avoid the reach of the first sale doctrine and to establish a basis in state con-
tract law for suing the software rental companies directly.,
26
A. Congress Intervenes to Prevent Software from Being Rented, Leased, or
Lent
The problem with a licensing approach was that uncertainty remained as
to whether state contract law would be preempted by the Federal Copyright Act
or by the Constitution itself, which grants exclusive authority over copyright
27matters to the federal government. Congress responded to this concern by
amending the first sale doctrine as it applies to computers and audio recordings
in 1990.28 Although this amendment does not forbid a purchaser from selling
his or her copy of a software program to another, it does prevent anyone along
the distribution chain from legally renting, leasing, or lending that copy for fi-
nancial gain.29  However, the first sale doctrine merely severs the copyright
holder's exclusive right of distribution; it does not entitle immediate or remote
purchasers to copy that work.3° Since software cannot be used without a com-
puter first copying-at the very least-some sequence of its copyrighted code
into the computer's random access memory (RAM), Congress included a provi-
sion in the Copyright Act to enable immediate or remote purchasers to make a
copy of the program if doing so is necessary as an "essential step in the utiliza-
tion of [the] program., 31 Because the first sale doctrine applies only to transfers
in ownership, if a software developer merely grants a license rather than making
an outright "sale" of a copy of its product, the first sale doctrine does not ap-
ply.32 Therefore, software developers encountered a dilemma: how could they
sell the media on which the software program is fixed to the consumer for a
onetime purchase price-thus maximizing profit-while at the same time retain
ownership in the individual copies themselves? Enter the rolling contract.
33
26 Id.
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have power to... promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveries."); 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-122 (2005).
28 Step-Saver, 939 F.2d 91 at 96 n.7. See also Computer Software Rental Amendments Act 17
U.S.C. § 109(b) (2005) ("Notwithstanding [the first sale doctrine], unless authorized by ... the
owner of copyright in a computer program... [no person] may, for the purposes of direct or indi-
rect commercial advantage, dispose of, or authorize the disposal of, the possession of that [com-
puter program] by rental, lease, or lending."). Excluded from this provision are nonprofit libraries
and nonprofit educational institutions, due to the noncommercial nature of their rental, lease, and
lending practices.
29 Step-Saver, 939 F.2d 91 at 96 n.7.
30 Nadan, supra note 23, at 560-61.
31 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2005); Nadan, supra note 23, at 56-63.
32 Nadan, supra note 23, at 564-67.
33 Where EULAs are deemed valid and enforceable, but treated as apart from the sale of the
media they are often called "rolling" or "layered" contracts, because the sale of the media upon
7
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B. Does Software Differ from Other Copyrighted Works?
Software developers contend that computer software is a unique form of
copyrighted work.34 Like other forms of material expression, software consists
of an original work of authorship fixed in a reproducible, tangible medium.
35
However, developers aver that unlike other forms of material expression, a sin-
gle copy of software is capable of determining the success or failure of an entire
business.36 This fact, if true, arguably creates two legitimate justifications for
treating software differently from other forms of recorded media: market seg-
mentation and liability limitation.37
Market segmentation is the categorical arrangement of prospective buy-
ers into sectors, according to each buyer's price elasticity of demand.38 The
software industry achieves this by charging its commercial users more than the
general public or academic users for substantially similar versions of their prod-
uCtS. 39 Price discrimination is generally legal in this context, and there are sig-
nificant policy reasons for permitting market segmentation in the sale of soft-
ware. If software developers were to charge the same rate to all users, not only
would consumer costs increase to equalize the current price differential, but the
aggregate price would increase as well, because the total number of consumers
purchasing the software would decline.40 Furthermore, allowing academic pur-
chasers a lower price than commercial entities promotes human capital to the
benefit of society as a whole by increasing access to the tools that foster the
technical skills of those entering the job market, which in turn leads to a more
productive workforce and greater taxable revenue.
Without some artificially constructed restraint on alienation, software
would be difficult, if not impossible, to segment in this manner. As pointed out
by Judge Easterbrook in ProCD, a watershed decision41 on the enforceability of
EULAs, "[t]o make price discrimination work.., the seller must be able to con-
trol arbitrage," because a purchaser "could buy the software [at the lower con-
which the program is fixed is sold as a good, whereas the license is treated as a separate lamina of
the contract (even though the buyer may not be aware of its terms prior to delivery of the goods).
Essentially, courts upholding the validity of layered contracts recognize that a contract has been
formed, but allow new terms to be created (i.e., "roll in") over time.
34 There has been much debate over whether software should be treated separately from the
media upon which it is fixed. See infra this Part.
35 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2005).
36 See Nadan, supra note 23, at 557.
37 Id.
38 See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, MICROECONOMICs 69 (16th ed. 1998).
The authors provide an example of market segmentation as the price discrimination engaged in by
airlines in separating their business and leisure clientele.
39 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996).
40 Id.
41 But see infra, note 68.
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sumer price] and resell to a commercial user [at a higher price]," thus eliminat-
ing the developer's purpose in providing the software to a segmented market.
42
Additionally, some limitation on software developers' liability to con-
sequential damages is necessary to control costs. Because an entire company
may rely on only one software program to conduct business, permitting recov-
ery for product liability without limitation can potentially hold a developer lia-
ble for consequential damages amounting to millions or even billions of dollars
for a single copy of a software product.43 This is not often the case with tradi-
tional copyrighted works, such as books, music, movies, and art.44
C. The Practice of Distributing Software Under License Continues
While market segmentation and liability limitation might be appropriate
justifications for treating software differently from other forms of intellectual
property, one justification often advanced by courts favoring differential treat-
ment of software is not: ease of reproduction. In Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Stargate
Software, Inc., Judge Ware correctly noted that "software is unique from other
forms of copyrighted information. "45 However, Judge Ware's analysis faltered
soon thereafter:46 "[s]oftware fundamentally differs from more traditional forms
of medium, such as print or phonographic materials, in that software .. . [is]
more readily and easily copied on a mass scale in an extraordinarily short
amount of time and relatively inexpensively. 47 As one commentator correctly
points out, print and music can be converted into digital form and copied at
comparable rates.48 By the time Stargate was decided, this was clearly evident,
and as technology evolves, the differences in time and expense of copying be-
tween the various types of media will continue to diminish.49 Thus, the tradi-
tional rationale-and hence, a number of court decisions-for treating software
differently from other forms of copyrighted work is no longer valid.50 Adhering
to this "duplication and dissemination" justification for differential treatment of
42 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450.
43 See Nadan, supra note 23, at 586-88.
44 Id. at 557.
45 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
46 See Nadan, supra note 23, at 558:
The usual argument is that software is different because it is so easily copied,
therefore it needs special protection. This argument breaks down, however, as
the advent of photocopying machines and electronic storage (including digi-
tally recorded movies, music and e-books) makes copying of these other copy-
righted works just as problematic.
47 Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Stargate, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
48 See Nadan, supra note 23, at 558.
49 Id.
5o See, e.g., Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriffs Dept., 447 F.3d 769, 781 (Cal.
2006) (quoting Stargate, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1059).
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software, courts would be compelled to enforce EULAs in every form of copy-
righted medium; the creators of such works would be more than happy to oblige
by "licensing" their products accordingly. 5' However, unless and until the
courts and society are willing to reject the first sale doctrine in toto, Judge
Ware's rationale should be spurned from future decisions.
Although software may be unique in its use, distribution method, and
potential liability concerns, the nature of the work itself is not. The majority of
courts treat software as "goods" within the meaning of Article 2 of the U.C.C.
52
Of those few that do not, the mistake that such courts make is to assume that
Article 2 cannot or should not apply to the purchase of software, based on the
fact that software includes both tangible and intangible properties. 53 Routinely
offered as the rationale for such an argument is that the media conveying the
program code is incidental to what the buyer is actually paying for: an intangible
copyrighted work.54  Such an approach distorts the issue. Article 2 of the
U.C.C. is a body of law governing contracts as they relate to transactions in
goods, not the goods themselves. A valid, enforceable license agreement is just
that-a contract-and if a thing is movable, sellable, and not money "in which
the price is to be paid,, 55 investment securities, or things in action (rights to re-
cover money or property) it is "goods" within the meaning of Article 2 of the
U.C.C. 56  Furthermore, Article 2 explicitly provides that included within its
scope are "sale[s] of a part interest in existing identified goods. 57 A purchase
51 Attempts to bind consumers through similarly adhesive licensing "contracts" in other forms
of media, such as books and music, have been used for over one hundred years in the United
States, but have failed to pass contractual muster. See Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243
U.S. 490 (1917); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908), discussed infra Part II.D.
52 See supra note 10.
53 See, e.g., U.S. v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301, 1308 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that a "computer
program itself is an intangible intellectual property, and as such, it alone cannot constitute [stolen]
goods" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (2006)); Microstrategy, Inc. v. Netsolve,
Inc., 368 F.Supp.2d 533, 537 (E.D. Va. 2005) (holding that the conversion claim was preempted
by the Copyright Act because "Plaintiff alleges only the retention of intangible property, that is,
software"; thus, "[n]o physical object was unlawfully retained" by the defendant). Note that
"[t]he definition of goods is based on the concept of movability," not tangibility. U.C.C. § 2-105
cmt. 1 (2000).
54 Such an argument is akin to saying that a pack of Wrigley's Spearmint chewing gum is not a
good because the stick of gum is incidental to what the buyer is actually paying for: "pure chew-
ing satisfaction." See Computer (William Wrigley, Jr., Co. television commercial 1987) (on file
with the United States Copyright Office, Library of Congress).
55 U.C.C. § 2-105. The distinction is required because money can be "goods" where it is the
subject matter of the transaction, such as in a currency exchange. See id. cmt. 1. Thus money,
which is intrinsically worthless but ascribed value on account of what it represents (an incorporeal
property), is excluded from the definition of goods based solely on the manner of its use (other-
wise, every non-bartered agreement would be within the scope of Article 2), notwithstanding the
paper on which the money being treated as a commodity is printed is incidental to what the buyer
is actually paying for: an intangible right to discharge future debts.
56 U.C.C. § 2-105.
57 U.C.C. § 2-105(3) (emphasis added).
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of consumer software at retail amounts to, at the very least, ownership in the
medium in which the program is fixed, which is arguably a "sale of a part inter-
est" in the program itself-without the medium in which it is fixed, the program
would cease to exist. Therefore, simply because the thing purchased involves
an incorporeal component, even as its gravamen, does not mean that it falls out-
side of Article 2's scope.
58
Few would argue that the purchase of an audio compact disk (CD) is not
a sale of "goods," and while the CD medium itself may be worth only pennies,
the intangible intellectual property-that is, the music embedded in the CD-
may be of immeasurable value as a work of art. However, the time, creativity,
skill, and energy expended in the making of the audio recorded on the disk is of
no consequence in the determination of whether Article 2 governs its purchase.
Furthermore, with modern technology, an audio CD is no less easily copied than
is a computer program. As Judge Weis explained in Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys
Corp., 59 a computer program, like an audio CD, contains "an intellectual process
... implanted in a medium [and] widely distributed" to consumers, and while
"[tihe music is produced by the artistry of musicians and in itself is not a 'good,'
... when transferred to a laser-readable disc [it] becomes a readily merchantable
commodity." 60 Comparably, "when a professor delivers a lecture, it is not a
good, but, when transcribed as a book, it becomes a good.",61 Judge Weis fur-
ther dispelled the notion that software is unique from other copyrighted work by
virtue of the nature of the work itself, stating, "[t]hat a computer program may
be copyrightable as intellectual property does not alter the fact that once in the
form of a floppy disc or other medium, the program is tangible, moveable and
available in the marketplace. 62
Judge Weis' analysis is correct. Software is simply a product that re-
sults from an intellectual process whereby the programmer authors a set of
commands into patterns, called "syntax. 63 These commands instruct the beha-
vior of a computer, similar to the way in which the law is written into com-
mands, called "statutes," that instruct the behavior of society (the difference
being that unlike computers, people have freewill, and thus are able to decide
58 Take, for example, a hand-made table. Unquestionably, the craftsperson's art in construct-
ing the table is a service, thus any contract entered into for the construction of such a table would
not be governed by the U.C.C. However, once completed, the table is a fixed manifestation of the
artist's craft, and while the cost of the labor in creating the table may centuple that of the price of
the wood, no reasonable argument could be made that a remote purchaser was buying anything
other than a good, even if an emblem or carving in the table could be considered a copyrighted
work, as separate from the utilitarian aspects of the article and capable of independent existence.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2005).
59 925 F.2d 670 (3rd Cir. 1991).
60 Id. at 675.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 This description of software, while overly simplistic, is adequate for present purposes.
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whether to obey such commands). In this sense, software authorship is not un-
like a writer penning a book. In order for the syntax to be meaningful to the
computer, it must be arranged in a specific form, just as a sentence must be con-
structed according to the rules of grammar to be meaningful to the reader. The
programming language, or source code, is then converted into bits-binary di-
gits taking the form of either zero or one-which are stamped into a CD as a
series of indentations (called "pits" and "lands"), or "burned" as distortions in
the surface of a phthalocyanine or azo dye, in the case of a compact disk-
recordable (CD-R),64 and read by a laser, similar to the manner in which a stylus
passes along the groove on a phonographic record-albeit in a digital, rather
than an analog, signal.65 In essence, the program itself, while originally existing
as intangible thought in the programmer's mind, is transcribed onto a CD, just
as the professor's lecture is "transcribed as a book" in Judge Weis' example.66
Therefore, whenever an intellectual process is recorded, or "fixed," into a CD, a
digital versatile disc (DVD), book, phonographic record, or any other form of
tangible medium, that item becomes a good. Bifurcating software into tangible
and intangible elements and applying the law differently to each while treating
similar works dissimilarly produces an arbitrary result-the bane of section 1-
130(3) of the U.C.C.6 7 Furthermore, as technology advances, the line between
traditional notions of "goods" and "software" is diminished. Today, software is
used to run cars, traffic lights, microwave ovens, portable audio devices-
virtually all electronic devices. However, despite the software industry's at-
tempts to dazzle the courts with legal legerdemain, there is nothing "mystical"
about software; a court should not allow technological ignorance to govern its
analysis.
64 Oliver Slattery et al., Stability Comparison of Recordable Optical Discs-A Study of Error
Rates in Harsh Conditions, 109 J. RES. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. 517, 520 (2004)
("The three dye types typically used in CD-Rs [are] phthalocyanine, cyanine and azo.").
65 Just as vibration of the stylus traversing the groove in the phonographic record creates a
signal that is amplified into sound by a phonograph, reflection and refraction of light as the laser
passes over stamped pits and lands in the CD or the burned marks in the CD-R create a pulse that
is read and converted into zeroes and ones by a computer.
66 Advent, 925 F.2d at 675.
67 An underlying purpose of the U.C.C. is to "make uniform the law among the various juris-
dictions." Arbitrary decisions diminish the probability of uniformity. Although not the focus of
this Note, software downloaded from the internet makes a stronger case for non-U.C.C. gover-
nance. However, in such a transaction, the consumer is still contracting to purchase "things...
moveable at the time of identification to the contract for sale," notwithstanding such "things"
being minute electromagnetic particles. U.C.C. § 2-105 (2000). Most jurisdictions that have
considered the issue have held that electricity, water, and even gaseous fuels, when sold, are
"goods," falling within the scope of Article 2 of the U.C.C. See e.g., Gary D. Spivey, Annotation,
Electricity, Gas, or Water Furnished by Public Utility as "Goods" within Provisions of Uniform
Commercial Code, Article 2 on Sales, 48 A.L.R.3d 1060 (1973).
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D. The Legacy of ProCD and Its Progeny
While not the first opinion to legitimize a shrinkwrap agreement,68
ProCD is the case most frequently cited in the decisions that achieve this out-
come. 69 In reaching this result, ProCD and the cases that follow its jurispru-
dence uphold the validity of shrinkwrap, clickwrap, and other such contracts of
adhesion based on the notion that "[any buyer finding such a demand can pre-
vent formation of the contract by returning the package, as can any consumer
who concludes that the terms of the license make the software worth less than
the purchase price.",70 This notion was advanced by the ProCD court in its oft-
quoted, pruned form: "[n]otice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to
return the software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable.",7'
Most shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements require the buyer to either
agree to the terms or else return the software (and any accompanying hardware)
to the place of purchase for a refund.72 Simply "returning the package," howev-
68 See e.g., McCrimmon v. Tandy Corp., 414 S.E.2d 15 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). Notwithstanding
Judge Easterbrook's claims to the contrary, McCrimmon does directly address the issue of "the
sequence of money now, terms later." ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir.
1996) ("[O]nly three cases (other than ours) touch on the subject, and none directly addresses it.").
Although the McCrimmon court did not specifically refer to the license as a shrinkwrap agree-
ment, the description of the license litigated fits the definition of the term. See supra note 8. The
agreement at issue in ProCD fits the definition of both a clickwrap and a shrinkwrap agreement;
however, because the ProCD court referred to the license as a shrinkwrap agreement, so too will
this Note ("[Tihe software splashed the license on the screen and would not let [the defendant]
proceed without indicating acceptance."). ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452. Furthermore, the distinction
does not affect the analysis for current purposes.
69 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1447.
70 Id. at 1452. See also Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); M.A. Mor-
tenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999); Brower v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246, 250-51 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
71 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451.
72 See e.g., APPLE, INC., SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT FOR MAC OS X 1 (2007) [hereinafter
APPLE, MAC OS], http://images.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/macosx105.pdf (last visited Feb. 8,
2008); APPLE, INC., SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT FOR ITUNES 1 (2007) [hereinafter APPLE,
ITuNES], http://images.apple.com /legal/sla/docs/itunes.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2008). Note that
the license agreements require the buyer to either agree to the terms or "return the Apple software
to the place where you obtained it for a refund" with no other recourse. Id. See also MICROSOFT
CORP., LICENSE TERMS FOR MICROSOFT WINDOWS VISTA 1 (2007) [hereinafter MICROSOFT, VISTA],
http://download.microsoft.com/documents/useterms/Windows%20Vista UltimateEnglish_36dof
e99-75e4-4875-8153-889cf5105718.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2008); MICROSOFT CORP., MICROSOFT
SOFTWARE LICENSE TERMS 2007 MICROSOFT OFFICE SYSTEM DESKTOP APPLICATION SOFTWARE 1
(2007) [hereinafter MICROSOFT, OFFICE], http://www.microsoft.comldownloads/details.aspx?
FamilyId=4285D6F7-DFDD-44A6-A21D-8E9899082BI5&displaylang=en (available for down-
load) (last visited Feb. 8, 2008). Note that the license agreements require the buyer to either agree
to the terms or "return [the software] to the retailer for a refund or credit." MICROSOFT, VISTA at
1. Unlike Apple, Microsoft purportedly gives the buyer another option if the retailer refuses to
accept the item on return, stating "[i]f you cannot obtain a refund there, contact Microsoft ... or
see www.microsoft.com/info/naretums.htm." However, the end result may be the same, as this
site lists reseller and retailer products under the heading: "What Products Are Not Eligible for a
13
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er, is not always effective as a remedy. For example, Best Buy, a major retailer
of consumer electronics, explicitly states in its return policy that "[n]on-
returnable items include ... [o]pened computer software [which] can be ex-
changed for the identical item but cannot be returned for a refund. 73 As is most
often the case in consumer software purchased at retail today, the terms govern-
ing the license are not fully revealed to the buyer until after (or just prior to)
installation of the program itself. If the buyer did not agree to the first item's
terms, exchanging that item for the identical item solves nothing.
Still, the vast majority of buyers will install and use the software follow-
ing its purchase. Many of them will not read or understand the terms to which
they are "assenting., 74 Still others might comprehend the terms of the license,
but disregard them under the assumption that they are unenforceable. What
awaits the unwary consumer may be surprising. 76 Despite what many consum-
ers believe, they might not be "buying" the software. Never mind that the con-
sumer goes to a store to shop for software, makes a selection, pays a onetime
price as part of the transaction (including a "sales" tax, which is indicated as
such on the receipt), walks out of the store without signing anything (save for
perhaps a credit card receipt), and makes no arrangements for any other type of
agreement concerning the software (including a future charge or renewal fee)-
despite looking like every other purchase this consumer has ever made-the
consumer does not own the software. Why? Because the software industry says
so, that is why. What the consumer gets instead is a non-negotiated license, a
game where the licensor writes the rules, which the consumer cannot read until
Refund?" (emphasis added). [Author's note: this site was altered sometime between February and
December of 2008 to redirect the user to http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/productrefund/refund
.mspx. The site now provides that "[a]ll software and hardware products ... come with a Micro-
soft 45-Day Money-Back Guarantee." However, the refund is still "subject to ... [the] license
agreement provisions."]
73 See Best Buy's Store Return Policy, http://www.bestbuy.com/site/olspage.jsp?type=page
&entryURLType=&entryURLID=&categoryld=cat 10004&contentld= 1117177044087&id=cat 12
098 (last visited Feb. 8, 2008). See also Wal-Mart's Return Policy, http://www.walmart
.com/catalog/catalog.gsp?cat=538459#37441 (last visited Feb. 8, 2008) ("Computer software:
Must be returned unopened."). Most, if not all, software retailers have similar polices.
74 According to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (WVSCA), "it makes little
difference whether [contracts of adhesion] are in fact comprehensible-because people simply
don't read them." Ex rel Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 270 n.2 (W. Va. 2002).
75 See, e.g., Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 761 (D. Ariz.
1993) ("[Plaintiff] admits that he read the license agreement but thought it was unenforceable and
incapable of overriding the specific representations made to him by [Defendant's] employees.").
76 Among the various impermissible deviations in acceptance to an offer for the sale of goods
is the addition of terms that "materially alter" the offer. Such terms do not become part of the
contract, even between merchants. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) (2000). Clauses resulting in surprise or
hardship are among those which would materially alter the contract "if incorporated without ex-
press awareness by the other party." U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4 (2000). Whether buying a product
with notice or a partial listing of terms on the outside packaging, opening a package and using a
program (in the case of shrinkwrap agreements), or clicking "I agree" with the mouse (in the case
of clickwrap agreements) constitutes "express awareness" is subject to debate.
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leaving the store and opening the "poke"; a game where the licensor reserves the
right to change the rules at any time, often without notice, sometimes adding
new rules while the game is being played;77 a game where the consumer must
dance to the developer's tune or else not play the game at all.78
For over a century, courts have refused to play along with various in-
dustries calling what amounts to a sale a mere "license" under similar sets of
terms. In Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,79 the plaintiff printed books, for which it
77 See e.g., Apple, Inc.'s iTunes Store Terms of Service, http://www.apple.comlegal/itunes/
us/service.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2008):
This is a legal agreement between you and Apple... Apple reserves the right,
at any time and from time to time, to update, revise, supplement, and other-
wise modify this Agreement and to impose new or additional rules, policies,
terms, or conditions on your use of the Service. Such updates, revisions, sup-
plements, modifications, and additional rules, policies, terms, and conditions
(collectively referred to in this Agreement as "Additional Terms") will be ef-
fective immediately and incorporated into this Agreement.
Because services are governed by the common law of contracts, modifications require additional
consideration on the part of the promisee under the preexisting duty rule, thereby rendering the
above "agreement" unenforceable with respect to purchases made prior to the modification.
78 In ProCD, Judge Easterbrook compared the presentation of shrinkwrap terms in software
transactions with the issues that surround other types of commerce, such as insurance, airline
travel, and concerts, stating that "insurance takes effect immediately even though the home office
reserves the right to withdraw coverage later" and "[t]o use the ticket is to accept the terms, even
terms that in retrospect are disadvantageous." ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th
Cir. 1996). However, contracts involving insurance and airline travel are contracts for indemnifi-
cation and services, and are therefore unquestionably outside the scope of Article 2, so such com-
parisons to contracts governed by Article 2 are meaningless (because Judge Easterbrook assumed
software to be "goods" within the meaning of the U.C.C. in ProCD, the question of whether Ar-
ticle 2 applies is inapplicable for present purposes). Moreover, modifications to airline tickets are
expressly governed by federal law. See 49 U.S.C. § 41707 (1994) ("To the extent ... prescribe[d]
by regulation, an air carrier may incorporate by reference in a ticket or written instrument any
term of the contract."); 14 C.F.R. § 253.5 (2008) (implying that if the passenger is given notice,
"incorporated terms may include... [the right] to change terms of the contract").
Working his way to goods transactions, Judge Easterbrook next explained that a shrinkwrap
agreement is not unlike a radio sale, where the buyer may not see the warranty until it is "read for
the first time in the comfort of home" or a prescription, which "come[s] with a list of ingredients
on the outside and an elaborate package insert on the inside [which] describes drug interactions,
contraindications, and other vital information-but, if [the defendant] is right, the purchaser need
not read the package insert, because it is not part of the contract." Id. The problem with such
comparisons is that radio sales are clearly governed by the Magnuson-Moss Act (see infra Part
IV.C.4) and usually state consumer protection law (see infra Part IV.B.) and radios cannot per-
form tasks such as transmitting the consumer's private information to unknown recipients via the
internet (see infra note 108 and accompanying text). Drugs are prescribed under a doctor's guid-
ance, care, and consultation-imagine requiring a lawyer behind every consumer's shoulder, to
explain the risks, as the consumer examines the terms of a clickwrap agreement. Even over-the-
counter medications are carefully regulated by the Food and Drug Administration, which eva-
luates drug safety and dictates what information must be included on the packaging. The only
entities regulating the reliability and safety of software are the free-market and the software indus-
try itself.
79 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
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held a valid copyright, with a notice that "[t]he price of this book at retail is $1
net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, and a sale at a less price will
be treated as an infringement of the copyright. ' 80 When the defendant, R. H.
Macy and Company (Macy's), began selling the books for less than a dollar,
Bobbs-Merrill sought injunctive relief under the copyright statutes, based on the
terms set forth in the notice. The United States Supreme Court (SCOTUS) con-
strued this as an attempt "by a notice [to require] that such sales must be made
at a fixed sum," and found this to be invalid under copyright law.81 The Court
stated that Macy's "made no agreement as to the control of future sales of the
book, and took upon themselves no obligation to enforce the notice printed in
the book, undertaking to restrict retail sales to a price of $1 per copy," but did
not specifically address whether the license was a valid form of contract because
"[tihere [was] no claim . . . of contract limitation [asserted by Plaintiff], nor
license agreement controlling the subsequent sales of the book., 82 The Court
held that, having sold the books in question, the plaintiff could not thereafter use
the copyright statutes to control the price of subsequent sales to remote purchas-
ers via license agreement.
In Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co.,83 SCOTUS examined a licens-
ing scheme similar to the modem day EULA and rejected it.84 The Court held a
"License Notice," similar in its terms and effect to a box-top license, 85 to be
invalid despite the fact that the terms of the license were plainly visible in their
entirety prior to purchase. Although not the first case to invalidate this type of
restriction, the facts of the case were more analogous to the modem day EULA
than previous cases decided by the Court, because the terms of the license pur-
ported to bind not only the retailers, but consumers as well. In Straus, the plain-
tiff, a manufacturer of phonographs and phonograph records, had a contract with
its distributers whereby its machines were to be "licensed" to consumers, not
sold,86 and were to be "used only with sound records, sound boxes, and needles
manufactured by the plaintiff., 87 The terms of the "license" were set forth on
the machines themselves, and stated that "title to the machine shall remain in the
80 Id. at 341.
81 Id. at 351.
82 Id. at 350.
83 243 U.S. 490 (1917).
84 Although persuasive, not even SCOTUS can bind the states on matters of contract law,
except with respect to questions of federal law, such as the FAA. See supra note 19.
85 See supra note 22.
86 The "license" terms provided, inter alia, that "[t]itle shall remain in the Victor Talking Ma-
chine Company" and that dealers had the right "to convey the license to the public to use the said
machine only when a royalty of not less than $200.00 shall have been paid, and upon considera-
tion that all the conditions of license shall be strictly observed." Victor Talking Mach. Co. v.
Strauss, 230 F. 449, 451 (2d Cir. 1916), rev'd, 243 U.S. 490 (1917).
87 243 U.S. at 495. Correspondingly, the plaintiff's "records and sound boxes [were] licensed
only for use with [its] machines." Victor, 230 F. at 451.
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plaintiff, which shall have the right to repossess it upon breach of any of the
conditions of the notice ... and [that] the acceptance of the machine is declared
to be 'an acceptance of these conditions.', 8 8 To which the Court replied:
[It is] clear that this "License Notice" is not intended as a secu-
rity for any further payment upon the machine, for the full
price, called a "royalty," was paid before the plaintiff parted
with the possession of it... that, notwithstanding its apparently
studied avoidance of the use of the word "sale," and its frequent
reference to the word "use," . . . [t]here remains for this "Li-
cense Notice," so far as we can discover, the function only of
fixing and maintaining the price of plaintiff's machines to its
agents and to the public .... Courts would be perversely blind
if they failed to look through such an attempt as this "License
Notice" thus plainly is to sell property for a full price, and yet to
place restraints upon its further alienation, such as have been
hateful to the law from Lord Coke's day to ours, because ob-
noxious to the public interest. The scheme of distribution is not
a system designed to secure to the plaintiff and to the public a
reasonable use of its machines, within the grant of the patent
laws, but is in substance and in fact a mere price-fixing enter-
prise, which, if given effect, would work great and widespread
injustice to innocent purchasers, for it must be recognized that
not one purchaser in many would read such a notice, and that
not one in a much greater number, if he did read it, could under-
stand its involved and intricate phraseology, which bears many
evidences of being framed to conceal rather than to make clear
its real meaning and purpose. It would be a perversion of terms
to call the transaction intended to be embodied in this system of
marketing plaintiffs machines a "license to use the inven-
tion,' 8 9
Substitute the word "machine(s)" for "software," the words "within the grant of
the patent laws" with "within the freedom of contract," and "price-fixing enter-
prise" with "scheme to absolve itself of all liability no matter how egregious or
negligent its acts or omissions" and it becomes evident that the EULA is nothing
more than a rehash of a marketing scheme that was rejected by SCOTUS dec-
ades ago.
88 Victor, 243 U.S. at 495.
89 Id. at 500-01 (citing Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 16 (1913), which essentially
held that "to call the sale a license to use is a mere play upon words").
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III. TERRIBLE TERMS
Few industries employ more sweeping, blanket waiver provisions in
their "warranties" or attempt to leave the consumer with fewer remedies than
the software industry. 90 Most EULAs fly in the face of consumer protection
statutes without consequence, due to the "license" status the software developer
has carved out for itself. For example, Apple's Software License Agreement for
Mac OS X9' provides a ninety day limited warranty, which seems somewhat
reasonable, until the buyer takes a closer look at its terms. Written in 5.5 point
92
font, this "warranty" applies only to the media on which the software is fixed
(the CD), not the program itself, and Apple provides as "your exclusive remedy.
at Apple's option, a refund of the purchase price of the product containing the
Apple Software or replacement of the Apple Software. 9 3 As for the software
itself, the buyer "agrees" to accept it "as is" or not at all, "with all faults and
without warranty of any kind," and should the software "prove defective, you
assume the entire cost of all necessary servicing, repair or correction."' 94
Furthermore, "in no event shall Apple be liable for personal injury, or
any incidental, special, indirect or consequential damages whatsoever, includ-
ing, without limitation, damages for loss of profits, loss of data, business inter-
ruption or any other commercial damages or losses," even if those damages re-
sult from a defect known to Apple.95 Although the license acknowledges that
"[s]ome jurisdictions do not allow the limitation of liability for personal injury,
or of incidental or consequential damages, so this limitation may not apply to
you," regardless, "[i]n no event shall Apple's total liability to you for all damag-
es (other than as may be required by applicable law in cases involving personal
injury) exceed the amount of fifty dollars" and "[t]he foregoing limitations will
apply even if the above stated remedy fails of its essential purpose. 96 Apple's
iTunes, software running the popular consumer MP3 (MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3)
90 This section is primarily concerned with clickwrap terms for which the consumer is required
to "assent" prior to using software developed by Apple, Inc. and Microsoft Corp. These compa-
nies were not chosen to unfairly "single them out," but rather to illustrate some of the concerns
surrounding software that many consumers use on a regular basis. To the contrary, because Apple
and Microsoft develop products that saturate the market, they are under much closer scrutiny by
consumer advocacy groups and the like; therefore, many other software developers incorporate
terms into their license agreements that, if enforced, would be much more oppressive to the con-
sumer than those of Apple or Microsoft.
91 See APPLE, MAC OS, supra note 72.
92 The font used is 5.5 "Lucida Grande" (or its equivalent), as determined by copying and
pasting a portion of the text into a Microsoft Word document.
93 See APPLE, MAC OS, supra note 72, at 2 (emphasis added).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. Note that in all jurisdictions, including West Virginia, that have enacted section 2-719
of the U.C.C., "[l1imitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of con-
sumer goods is prima facie unconscionable."
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audio player, the iPod, is governed by a license following the Mac OS X license
agreement verbatim in the language quoted supra.97 Therefore, in the hypothet-
ical situation where iPods are found to cause permanent hearing damage, 98 or
cause pacemaker malfunction,99 due to defects known to Apple and not divulged
to the public, the most a consumer could recover if such a license were to be
upheld by a court would be fifty dollars, which would not even cover the cost of
the medical diagnosis.
Microsoft's Software License Terms governing its Windows Vista OS
and Office 2007 Professional programs fare somewhat better for the consumer
than do Apple's; however, the terms still leave much to be desired.' °° Although
the licenses provide, in ten point font, a one year limited warranty running from
the time of the first purchase--during which time "Microsoft will repair or re-
place the software at no charge" (buyer pays shipping) or refund the purchase
price if it cannot repair the defect-the buyer "can recover from Microsoft and
its suppliers only direct damages up to the amount [buyer] paid for the software
[but] cannot recover any other damages, including consequential, lost profits,
special, indirect or incidental damages ... even if... Microsoft knew or should
have known about the possibility of the damages."'0 1 Again, as with the Apple
licenses, if the terms are found to be conscionable and are otherwise upheld as
valid by a court, the consumer is left without any meaningful remedy.
97 See APPLE, iTUNES, supra note 72.
98 At least two cases have been filed against Apple, Inc., alleging that Apple's iPod causes
hearing loss due to an inherently defective design: Birdsong v. Apple Computer, Inc. (filed Janu-
ary 30, 2006) in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana and Patter-
son v. Apple Computer, Inc. (filed January 31, 2006), in United States District Court for the
Northern District of California. See Apple's 10-K filing with the SEC for the fiscal year ended
September 29, 2007, p. 25, available at: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/
000104746907009340/a2181030zI 0-k.htm.
99 One study conducted at the Thoracic and Cardiovascular Institute at Michigan State Univer-
sity found that iPods interfered with pacemakers in thirty percent of patients tested (even causing
one patient's pacemaker to stop functioning), when held two inches from patients' chests. See
http://www.med.umich.edu/opm/newspage/2007/ipods.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2008). See also
Mehul B. Patel et al., Pacemaker Interference with an iPod, 4 HEART RHYTHM 781 (2007). One
model of Apple's iPod, the "iPod shuffle," features a "built-in clip" that Apple once recommended
using to "[c]lip [the iPod] to your sleeve, lapel, coin pocket. No matter where you wear it, iPod
shuffle speaks volumes about your style" (emphasis added). However, the text was altered some-
time between February and December of 2008, and Apple now recommends that the user "[cilip it
to your sleeve, your running shorts, or your jacket." No reason is given for dropping "lapel" from
the list, nor is there any mention of the Michigan study. See Apple's advertisement at
http://www.apple.com/ipodshuffle/features.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2008). But see, Howard
Bassen, Low Frequency Magnetic Emissions and Resulting Induced Voltages in a Pacemaker by
iPod Portable Music Players, 7 BioMedical Engineering OnLine 7 (2008) ("it is not possible for
interference to be induced in a pacemaker by the music players we tested"). Available at
http://www.biomedical-engineering-online.comcontent/pdf/1475-925x-7-7.pdf. Interestingly,
this study did not use human subjects, unlike the Michigan study, which concluded that iPods did
cause pacemaker interference.
100 See MICROSOFT, VISTA and MICROSOFT, OFFICE, supra note 72.
101 Id. at 9; MICROSOFr, VISTA, supra note 72, at 6 (emphasis added).
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Other clickwrap agreements, if upheld, violate the consumer's funda-
mental, rather than economic, rights. For example, a number of such agree-
ments require users to waive their free speech rights by prohibiting them from
engaging in public criticism of the developing company or its products, publish-
ing benchmark results (an objective measure of a program's performance across
differing hardware configurations), or even reviews. 102 For example, in People
v. Network Assocs., Inc.,'0 3 the developer of McAfee anti-virus and firewall pro-
grams included in its license agreements that "[t]he customer shall not disclose
the results of any benchmark test [or] publish reviews of this product without
prior consent."'1 4 An online magazine sought permission to publish a review of
McAfee's product and was denied.10 5 Although the court issued an injunction
against Network Associates to prohibit it from restricting the right to publish
such results,' °6 similar provisions are still in place in many software products.
Such terms are in clear contradiction to the promotion of fair competition. Even
companies that do not overtly prevent the free discussion of their products often
require the publisher of a review or benchmark test to comply with certain
terms. 0 7
Furthermore, many clickwrap agreements, including Apple's and Mi-
crosoft's, require consumers to concede to the transmission of "technical and
related information including but not limited to technical information about your
computer" °8 or "appropriate systems computer information" 109 from the buyer's
computer to various companies and third parties across the internet without a
specific description of what information is collected or how it will be used, oth-
er than to state that such information will be utilized to "improve" their products
or to "verify compliance with the terms of this License."' 10 Although the terms
102 Lydia Pallas Loren, Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons in the Night: Reforming Copyright
Owner Contracting with Clickwrap Misuse, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 495, 497 n.9 (2004).
103 195 Misc.2d 384 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003)
104 Id. at 385-86.
105 Id. at 386.
106 Id. at 39 1.
107 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp.'s Microsoft.NET Framework Benchmark Testing Terms,
http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=66406 (last visited Dec. 8, 2008).
108 See APPLE, MAC OS, supra note 72, at 1; APPLE, ITuNEs, supra note 72, at 1 (emphasis add-
ed). See also Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). In Specht, internet users
who downloaded software from the defendant's website later discovered it was clandestinely
transmitting private data from their computers to the defendant.
109 See MICROSOFT, VISTA and MICROSOFT, OFFICE, supra note 72.
110 See APPLE, MAC OS and APPLE, ITUNES, supra note 72. Apple claims that it "may use this
information, as long as it is in a form that does not personally identify you ...." Exactly how any
verification of "compliance with the terms of [the] License" could be effective against alleged
infringers without "personally identify[ing]" them is unclear. Apple does claim in its privacy
policy that "[alt times we may be required by law or litigation [in other words, to sue you] to
disclose your personal information. We may also disclose information about you if we determine
[Vol. I111
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of Apple's and Microsoft's privacy policies are available online, neither policy
gives specifics or is comprehensive in describing what information is collected
or how it is used.' 11 Furthermore, such monitoring is completely unnecessary to
prevent software piracy because software developers can easily (and often do)
incorporate a registering process into their programs whereby each copy must be
activated after a set amount of days from installation to continue functioning.
By incorporating unique identifiers in the software's code and requiring users to
obtain a registration key directly from the developer, the software companies
can be sure that each copy of their product is activated only once, without hav-
ing to continually monitor a buyer's activities. When properly implemented,
such a system adequately protects the developer and the consumer because the
consumer knows when and what information is transmitted and the ability to
circumvent its protection is limited.
IV. LITIGATING SHRINKWRAP AND CLICKWRAP AGREEMENTS UNDER WEST
VIRGINIA LAW
Although the validity of shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements has yet
to be tested under West Virginia law, an examination of existing contract and
consumer law may provide a litigation framework for future cases and contro-
versies in the Mountain State. Recently, several members of the West Virginia
House of Delegates introduced a bill that, if adopted, would prohibit adhesion
contracts from waiving a person's state or federal constitutional rights. 12 If
that for national security, law enforcement, or other issues of public importance, disclosure is
necessary." Apple does not define the scope of "issues of public importance." See infra note 11.
II See Apple's Customer Privacy Policy, http://www.apple.comlegal/privacy/ (last visited
Dec. 30, 2008) ("[t]here are also times when it may be advantageous for Apple to make certain
personal information about you available to companies that Apple has a strategic relationship with
or that perform work for Apple ...."). When the consumer inquires into Microsoft's privacy
policy as directed in the License Terms for MICROsOFT, OFFICE, supra note 72, the consumer is
given a URL address, www.microsoft.com/genuine/office/Privacylnfo.aspx, which links to the
following: "We are sorry, the page you requested cannot be found. See below for search results
close to your request, or try a new search" (last visited Dec. 30, 2008). The link provided in
MICROSOFT, VISTA, supra note 72, is functional; however, as with Apple's Customer Privacy
Policy, no specific or comprehensive list of information is provided.
112 H.B. 2827, 78th Leg., 1st Sess. (W. Va. 2007). The language of the bill is available at:
httn)://www.legis.state.wv.us/Bill TextHTML/2007_SESSIONS/RS/BILLS/hb2827%20intr.htm.
The bill purports to invalidate adhesion waivers of constitutional rights as they apply to "goods
and services," defined to "include imported products, domestic products, banking services, insur-
ance policies as well as all other services or commodities offered for sale to consumers in this
state" (emphasis added). However, there is no consensus as to whether the purchase of software
amounts to a "sale" or a license or if such designations preclude the application of statutes purpor-
tedly applying only to sales, nor is this issue settled under West Virginia law. Arguably, the latter
language "as well as" in conjunction with the phrase "sale to consumers in this state" is severable
from the former language defining goods and services, thus broadening the bill's application to
potentially include products and intangibles contracted for, though not actually "sold." Id. The
use of the word "include" and the fact that the provision is remedial furthers such interpretation.
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enacted, the bill would amend the West Virginia Code to include a new section,
designated section 47-11 A-12b: "Adhesion waivers prohibited and unenforcea-
ble."'1 13 It is not entirely clear whether such proposed legislation would be
preempted by federal law or even be adopted; moreover, if software transactions
are deemed not to be sales, it is not clear if the statute would be applicable to
software EULAs. 114 Therefore, W. VA. H.B. 2827 is not necessarily dispositive
of the issue concerning the enforceability of shrinkwrap and clickwrap agree-
ments, and thus further examination is necessary.
A. Is Software "Goods" Under West Virginia Law?
First, any analysis of software contractual law must begin with a deter-
mination of whether software is "goods" within the meaning of Article 2 of the
U.C.C. West Virginia has adopted the language of the U.C.C. advanced by the
American Law Institute (ALI) and the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) virtually verbatim; 1 5 however, it has yet to
be settled whether West Virginia law will treat software as goods, although at
least one case suggests that it will. "Goods" are defined by the U.C.C. and West
Virginia law as "all things ... which are movable at the time of identification to
the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid."
' 1 6
As discussed in Part II, supra, the treatment of software is inconsistent among
jurisdictions. However, most courts will apply Article 2 of the U.C.C. to soft-
ware transactions either directly or by analogy, especially where that transaction
involves consumer ("canned") software. 117 Additionally, at least for taxation
purposes, West Virginia treats software as tangible personal property, which
"includes, but is not limited to... prewritten computer software."' 18 In Penn-
sylvania and West Virginia Supply Corp. v. Rose,119 the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of West Virginia (WVSCA) held that "standardized computer software
discs fall within the 'common, ordinary and accepted meaning' of the phrase
113 H.B. 2827.
114 Id. See also discussion on the FAA, infra Part IV.C. 1.
115 See W. VA. CODE §§ 46-2-101 to -725 (2006). See also, Vincent P. Cardi, The Experience
of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code in West Virginia, 93 W. VA. L. REv. 735 (1991).
For this reason, this Note will refer to the West Virginia Code and the U.C.C. interchangeably
when citing U.C.C. provisions hereinafter. As of this writing, West Virginia, like all other states
in the U.S., has not adopted the 2003 revisions to Article 2 of the U.C.C. as recommended by ALl
and NCCUSL. See supra note 1.
116 W. VA. CODE § 46-2-105 (1963).
117 See supra Part II.
118 W. VA. CODE § 1 -15A-1(12) (2003). The West Virginia Code defines "'[p]rewritten com-
puter software"' as "'computer software', including prewritten upgrades, which is not designed
and developed by the author or other creator to the specifications of a specific purchaser." Id. §
11-15B-2(32) (2006). In other words, prewritten software is software that is not custom designed.
119 368 S.E.2d 101 (W. Va. 1998).
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'tangible goods, wares, and merchandise,"" 120 and while this holding was made
in the context of taxation classification, the Rose court agreed with the pre-
UCITA holding in Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co. that "in-
tangibility should not be determined by the extent of use." 121 Therefore, "a copy
of a canned program does not lose its tangible character, because its content is a
reproduction of the product of intellectual effort, just as the phonorecord does
not become intangible, because it is a reproduction of the product of artistic
effort."' 22 Similarly, in Advent Systems Ltd. v. Unisys Corp.,23 the Third Circuit
examined "whether the U.C.C. applied to software per se," and held that "soft-
ware fits within the definition of a 'good' in the U.C.C.' ' 124 This view is in ac-
cordance with the majority view that "[i]f the contract is primarily for the provi-
sion of a software program, the U.C.C. will apply. The trend has been to recog-
nize that the U.C.C. governs software transactions.' 25
The U.C.C. was drawn to adapt to the changing nature of business.
West Virginia's Article 1 of the U.C.C. provides the general rules applicable to
transactions governed by any of the articles of Chapter 46 of the West Virginia
Code, unless otherwise displaced by a particular section governing the instant
transaction. 126 While not part of the statutes themselves, the Official Comments
that follow the U.C.C.'s provisions were written by its drafters and are therefore
highly persuasive.127 These comments acknowledge the fact that:
The courts have often recognized that the policies embodied in
an act are applicable in reason to subject-matter that was not
expressly included in the language of the act... even where the
subject-matter had been intentionally excluded from the act in
120 Id. at 104 (emphasis added). The significance of the classification of software as "tangible"
is discussed infra, Part IV.C.4.
121 464 A.2d 248, 255 (Md. 1983).
122 Id. at 261. Note that W. VA. CODE § 1 1-13D-2(17) (2008) uses the terms "prewritten" and
"canned" interchangeably. Generally, the terms are used to distinguish store bought software sold
at retail from custom-made software, which is often treated as a service rather than a good ("For
purposes of this section the term 'tangible personal property' shall include prewritten or 'canned'
computer software."). See also RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir.
1985) (applying the predominant purpose, or "gravamen," test to software transactions: "[iun
determining whether a contract is one of sale or to provide services we look to the essence of the
agreement... [h]ere, the sales aspect of the transaction predominates").
123 925 F.2d 670, 675-76 (3d Cir. 1991). See supra Part II.
124 Advent, 925 F.2d at 675-76.
125 CLASsEN, supra note 18, at 153.
126 W. VA. CODE § 46-1-102 (2006).
127 Notwithstanding this statement, WVSCA has expressly adopted "the official commentary to
the UCC... as a part of our Code" and assumes that "the legislature was aware of this commen-
tary when it adopted [Article 2 of the U.C.C.]." Greer Limestone Co. v. Nestor, 332 S.E.2d 589,
594 (W. Va. 1985). See Cardi, supra note 115 at 738 ("[WVSCA] raised the Comments to a new
level of authority [in Greer] .... ). See also infra note 189.
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general .... Nothing in the Uniform Commercial Code stands
in the way of the continuance of such action by the courts.
128
Nothing in Article 2 of the U.C.C., or in Chapter 46, Article 2 of the West Vir-
ginia Code, precludes treating software as a good. Chapter 46, Article 9, West
Virginia's equivalent to Article 9 of the U.C.C. (Secured Transactions), defines
goods to include:
[A] computer program embedded in goods and any supporting
information provided in connection with a transaction relating
to the program if. . . [t]he program is associated with the goods
in such a manner that it customarily is considered part of the
goods [or] by becoming the owner of the goods, a person ac-
quires a right to use the program in connection with the
goods.
129
West Virginia's Article 9 does preclude from the definition of goods "a comput-
er program embedded in goods that consist solely of the medium in which the
program is embedded," thus distinguishing software sold with hardware from
software sold in a standalone transaction. 30 However, the scope of West Vir-
ginia's Article 9 is limited to transactions that create a security interest in per-
sonal property.' 3 ' Therefore, this limitation is not likely determinative in set-
tling the issue of whether software is "goods" within the scope of West Virgin-
ia's Article 2.
1. Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap Agreements Are Unenforceable Un-
der West Virginia Common Law
Ultimately, whether software is treated as "goods" within the meaning
of Article 2 of the U.C.C. under West Virginia law in the consumer context may
very well be dispositive of the question as to whether shrinkwrap and clickwrap
agreements are enforceable in the state. Even under the line of cases holding
that EULAs are valid and enforceable, software licenses are treated as "ordinary
contracts accompanying the sale of products," and are therefore "governed by
the common law of contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code."'132 Because
no other law relevant to the issue has been adopted in West Virginia, if Article 2
does not apply, at least by analogy, the common law is all that remains to go-
vern the transaction. Such a determination would likely render shrinkwrap and
128 U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 1 (2004) (emphasis added).
129 W. VA. CODE § 46-9-102(44) (2006).
130 Id.
131 W. VA. CODE § 46-9-109 (2005).
132 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996).
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clickwrap agreements unenforceable because the rationale under which such
terms are theoretically permissible is dependent on the changes that the U.C.C.
makes to the common law.
Whether categorized as a sale or otherwise, a consumer purchase of
software at retail is a contract. By placing the item on display, the retailer is
making an invitation to bargain, not an offer. 133 The consumer makes an offer
to purchase the software, which the retailer accepts by receiving payment. Were
the roles reversed, a retailer would be bound to produce as many items as were
accepted or else be liable in breach. 34 Shrinkwrap and clickwrap terms are not
disclosed to the consumer until after the purchase is complete. Thus, without
the benefit of the U.C.C.'s liberal rules regarding the formation of contracts,
35
the late terms must either be a proposal to modify the original agreement, a re-
quest for a waiver, or an offer to enter into a new contract altogether.
136
Under West Virginia common law, "[a] new agreement made under the
provisions for modification in a contract must have all of the requisites of a va-
lid and enforceable contract or it will not be binding."' 137 The requisites of a
valid and enforceable contract are "competent parties, legal subject-matter, val-
uable consideration, and mutual assent."'' 38 Therefore, if a court were to deter-
133 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 cmt. b (1981).
134 Although this distinction is a basic concept of the law, it is apparently lost on Judge Easter-
brook: "A vendor, as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct, and may propose
limitations on the kind of conduct that constitutes acceptance. A buyer may accept by performing
the acts the vendor proposes to treat as acceptance." ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452. But see Klocek v.
Gateway, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340 (D. Kan. 2000) ("[T]he Seventh Circuit [in ProCD] pro-
vided no explanation for its conclusion that 'the vendor is the master of the offer.' In typical
consumer transactions, the purchaser is the offeror, and the vendor is the offeree."') (citations
omitted). However, in fairness, the defendant apparently made this claim in his brief. Id. at 1450.
See also ProCD, 908 F. Supp. 640, 652 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (citing Barker v. Allied Supermarket,
596 P.2d 870 (Okla. 1979)). Curiously, Easterbrook cited Peeters v. State, 142 N.W. 181 (Wis.
1913) in support of this pronouncement (also cited by the district court below in reaching the
opposite conclusion as to the legitimacy of the EULA at issue)-a case which stated that where "a
customer comes in, picks up an article, the selling price of which he knows, hands the proprietor
or a clerk the price thereof, which is received, and he departs with the article, the transaction con-
stitutes a 'sale,"' in direct derogation from the "license" status claimed by the plaintiff software
developer. Peeters, 142 N.W. 182.
135 U.C.C. §§ 1-103 (2004); 2-204, 2-206, and 2-207 (2000).
136 Because a novation (a discharge of a valid, existing obligation or contract by the substitution
of a new, binding obligation or contract) is not possible without first making a new contract, the
distinction is not needed here. See Ray v. Donohew, 352 S.E.2d 729, 735 (W. Va. 1986).
137 Wheeling Downs Racing Ass'n v. West Virginia Sportservice, Inc., 199 S.E.2d 308, 311
(W. Va. 1973). Furthermore, the party seeking the modification bears the burden of proof, which
is "not sustained, as a matter of law, by merely showing the failure of plaintiff to protest the
change." Monto v. Gillooly, 147 S.E. 542, 543 (W. Va. 1929). Under West Virginia common
law, a modification is not binding without consideration. Exceptions to this rule are threefold:
frustration, promissory estoppel, and by statute. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89
(1981). Because none are applicable to software transactions, without section 2-209 of the U.C.C.,
modification is precluded.
138 Virginian Exp. Coal Co. v. Rowland Land Co., 131 S.E. 253, 262 (W. Va. 1926).
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mine that shrinkwrap or clickwrap terms constituted proposed modifications, the
terms could not become a part of the contract without additional, valuable con-
sideration. Consideration is defined in West Virginia as "'some right, interest,
profit, or benefit accruing to one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or
responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by another.' A benefit to the prom-
isor or a detriment to the promisee is sufficient consideration for a contract."'
139
With regard to end users, EULAs are designed to "give them nothing, but take
from them [... ] everything."'14  Although the consumer has paid the valuable
price set by the seller, shrinkwrap and clickwrap terms typically give the con-
sumer nothing that the law does not already require, and often purport to take
away that which the law preserves.1
4'
Furthermore, West Virginia recognizes that buyers are entitled to certain
implied rights, such as the implied warranty of fitness, irrespective of whether
Article 2 of the U.C.C. is applicable to the given transaction. In Thacker v. Ty-
ree,42 WVSCA rejected the doctrine of caveat emptor ("buyer beware") as it
applied to the purchase of a house. Implicitly acknowledging the inequities in
precluding implied warranties to house sales, merely because such transactions
fall outside of the scope of the U.C.C., the court stated that "[w]hatever its for-
mer status in the law of sales, the Uniform Commercial Code, by its implied
warranty of merchantability and fitness found in W.Va. Code, 46-2-314 and
315, has virtually abolished the doctrine [of caveat emptor] in the sale of
goods."' 143 Thus, the Thacker court held that:
[W]here a vendor is aware of defects or conditions which sub-
stantially affect the value or habitability of the property and the
existence of which are unknown to the purchaser and would not
be disclosed by a reasonably diligent inspection, then the ven-
dor has a duty to disclose the same to the purchaser. His failure
to disclose will give rise to a cause of action in favor of the pur-
chaser. 44
139 First Nat. Bank of Gallipolis v. Marietta Mfg. Co., 153 S.E.2d 172, 177 (W. Va. 1967)
(quoting 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts §§ 85, 96 (2007)) (citation omitted).
140 300 (Warner Bros. Pictures 2007).
141 See supra notes 90-107 and accompanying text. If whatever "rights" granted to the con-
sumer by the EULA were worth trading in exchange for the consumer relinquishing their legal
rights, the software developer would not have to "force" consent with an all-or-nothing contract of
adhesion. Put another way, if consent to the terms were optional, would anyone click the "I
agree" button? See infra note 148.
142 297 S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1982). Obviously, the purchase of a home is deserving of greater
protection under the law than most any other consumer purchase, but the point remains that the
doctrine of caveat emptor has dwindled in the consumer context.
143 Id. at 886.
144 Thacker, 297 S.E.2d at 888. Note that according to the terms of APPLE, MAC OS; APPLE,
ITuNEs; MICROSOFr, VISTA; and MICROSOFr, OFFICE, both Apple and Microsoft disclaim any duty
to disclose defects in their products. See supra text accompanying notes 95 and 101.
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Within months of deciding Thacker, WVSCA explicitly entitled home buyers to
an implied warranty of fitness and habitability. 145 Moreover, long before the
codification of the U.C.C. and the warranty of merchantability,' 46 West Virginia
courts imposed substantially similar assurances by operation of law to the sale
of goods.147 Software should be no different in this regard. If the West Virginia
courts were to find Article 2 of the U.C.C. inapplicable to software transactions,
such a technicality should not and likely would not preclude the imposition of
the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness, and because the proposed
modifications or request to form a new contract offered under shrinkwrap and
clickwrap terms confer no reasonably perceivable benefit to the end user, addi-
tional consideration is not given. Under this schema, the software company
carves out all of the rights, interests, profits, and benefits for itself to the end
user's detriment, imposing virtually all risk on the weaker party. 148 Although
consideration need not be equivalent in value to that for which it purports to be
exchanged, where no opportunity for objection to its adequacy is given, as is the
case in most software EULAs, especially clickwraps, consideration should
fail.' 49 Additionally, consideration must be stipulated for in good faith. 50 Good
faith has been defined by WVSCA as an "implied covenant that neither party
shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of
the other party to receive the fruits of the contract."' 5' A EULA, if enforced by
a court, would have the effect of destroying the consumer's right to use the
software-obviously the "fruit" of any purchase-unless the buyer assents to its
terms. Moreover, "a threat of non-performance made for some purpose unre-
145 Gamble v. Main, 300 S.E.2d 110, 113 (W. Va. 1983).
146 The warranty of merchantability is codified as W. VA. CODE § 46-2-314 (1963).
147 See, e.g., Gorby v. Bridgeman, 99 S.E. 88, 90 (W. Va. 1919) ("[W]here an article is sold
under an executory contract by description, or by a certain tradename, there is an implied warranty
that it will be a merchantable article of the kind described."). The U.C.C. supports this expansive
approach: "the warranty sections of [Article 2] are not designed in any way to disturb those lines
of case law growth which have recognized that warranties need not be confined to ... sales con-
tracts." U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 2 (2000).
148 The upshot for the consumer is that if the five cent CD on which the software is embedded
proves defective, the software manufacturer might replace it. See supra Part III. This remedial
"option" is completely lacking of consideration, because the failure to provide this remedy, at a
minimum, violates federal law under most EULAs by their own terms. See infra Part IV.C.4.
149 Lowther Oil Co. v. Guffey, 43 S.E. 101, 102 (W. Va. 1903) ("During the two years the
lessors did not object to the adequacy of the consideration, and it is too late to do so now.").
150 Lovett v. Eastern Oil Co., 70 S.E. 707, 708 (W. Va. 1911) (finding that "[tihe parties have
chosen to treat [one dollar] as a sufficient consideration" (emphasis added)).
151 Harless v. First Nat. Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270, 274 (W. Va. 1978) (quoting Fortune
v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Mass. 1977)). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1981) ("Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of
good faith in performance even though the actor believes his conduct to be justified.").
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lated to the contract, such as to induce the recipient to make an entirely separate
contract, is ordinarily improper."
152
At least in regard to building contracts, West Virginia courts will permit
a party to waive its rights without consideration and without the benefit of the
U.C.C.'s waiver provision (discussed infra).153 However, to be valid, a waiver
must be intentionally and voluntarily made. "Voluntary choice is of the very
essence of waiver. It is a voluntary act which implies a choice by the party to
dispense with something of value, or to forego some advantage which he might
at his option have demanded and insisted on." 154 A Hobson's choice is not vo-
luntary, nor is it a choice.1 55 In sum, new contracts, modifications, and waivers
are the only manner in which shrinkwrap and clickwrap terms could be intro-
duced to the consumer under the common law; however, all three require ele-
ments that cannot be met post-transaction in the aforementioned context. There-
fore, shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements are rendered unenforceable under
the common law of contracts in West Virginia.
2. Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap Agreements Are Enforced In Spite
of the U.C.C., Not Because of It
The U.C.C. codified and continued the common law rules of contracts
in many respects, but profoundly changed contractual law in several key areas
of commercial practice. With regard to promoting its underlying purposes and
policies of simplifying, clarifying, and modernizing the law governing commer-
cial transactions, 156 most would agree that it has been an amazing achievement.
The U.C.C. has handily resolved innumerable disputes and prevented countless
others from occurring. It has streamlined and economized contracting, provid-
ing certainty and confidence where once existed estimations and insecurity.
However, interpreting the law under the U.C.C. is an art, not a science. Not-
152 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 cmt. e (1981).
153 Steinbrecher v. Jones, 153 S.E.2d 295 (W. Va. 1967). Of course, construction contracts are
not properly within the scope of the U.C.C.
154 Hoffman v. Wheeling Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 57 S.E.2d 725, 735 (W. Va. 1950) (emphasis
added).
155 A (Thomas) Hobson's choice is a decision that offers no real alternative. The "choice" is to
either take or refuse something: "this one or none." A Hobson's choice is illusory because a
choice, by definition, requires an alternative: "this one or that one." An alternative is a choice
between two or more options. A popular example of a Hobson's choice is that which the Ford
Motor Company posed to the American public: "[a]ny customer can have a car painted any colour
that he wants so long as it is black." HENRY FORD, MY LIFE AND WORK 72 (1922). This would be
a decision between a black car or no car as opposed to a choice between black or red. See also
Philyaw v. Gatson, 466 S.E.2d 133, 138 (W. Va. 1995) (explaining that the claimant's choice was
not a Hobson's choice because "she had the opportunity to choose between running for elective
office or retaining her employment"). Note that the choice at issue was between two options, and
as such, it was not the same as deciding between "retaining her employment" or nothing (i.e.,
quitting her position as a magistrate clerk).
156 U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(l) (2004).
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withstanding the success of its flexible and facilitative mechanisms in adapting
to the increasingly complex demands of business, as evidenced by the inconsis-
tent holdings among the various jurisdictions regarding software litigation, EU-
LAs have tested the limits of the U.C.C.'s ability to accomplish its lofty ambi-
tion to "make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.' 57
First, the U.C.C. provides that parties may vary the "effect" of most of
its provisions by agreement, except that the obligations of good faith, diligence,
reasonableness, and care may not be disclaimed. 158 This means that parties may
alter by agreement the legal consequences that would otherwise flow from its
provisions. 159 This does not give the parties nor the courts carte blanche to alter
the meaning or application of its text-it is still, after all, a body of law.' 6° Of
course, the U.C.C. recognizes that reason and policy may require the application
of its concepts and provisions to matters "intentionally excluded from the act in
general,"' 6 1 but the U.C.C. brushes off attempts to define its terms and concepts
with a dictionary or the common law, except where its text is silent. While it
makes liberal use of the commercial context, courts are not free to ignore the
rules it expounds.
Second, the U.C.C. makes much ado about the concepts of course of
performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade. 162 Indeed, many of its pro-
visions are useless without them. Unfortunately for sellers, these concepts are
generally not applicable to shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements. To this end,
lest a court be tempted to seize upon them, an examination of the terms and their
application to the canned software purchase is warranted. A "course of perfor-
mance" is defined as "a sequence of conduct... that exists if... the transaction
involves repeated occasions for performance by a party; and ... the other party,
with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection
to it, accepts the performance or acquiesces in it without objection.'' 63 Most
canned software transactions involve a single transfer and delivery by the seller
and a single acceptance and payment on the part of the buyer.' 64 Typically,
shrinkwrap terms proclaim that by opening the package containing the media on
which the software is stored (a onetime event), the user is manifesting assent to
the agreement.' 65 Similarly, clickwrap terms are "splashed... on the screen and
157 Id. § 1-103(a)(3).
158 Id. § 1-302.
159 Id. § 1-302 cmt. 1.
160 Id.
161 Id. § 1-103 cmt. 1.
162 Id. § 1-303.
163 Id. § 1-303(a) (emphasis added).
164 Id. § 2-301 (2000).
165 Although a course of performance can be triggered by "repeated occasions for performance"
by either party, it is the non-performing party whose acquiescence is required. Id. § 1-303(a).
Some shrinkwrap agreements state that by using the software (a repeated event), the user is assent-
ing to its terms; however, this does not alleviate the requirement of an opportunity to object to the
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[will] not let [the user] proceed without indicating acceptance. 166 However,
clickwrap terms are generally proposed to the user only once, during the initial
launch of the program. Therefore, under both approaches, there is but one occa-
sion for "performance" and no "opportunity for objection to it"; hence, there is
no course of performance for the court to consider.' 67 A "course of dealing" is a
"sequence of conduct concerning previous transactions between the parties...
that is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding.'
' 68
This may be applicable to some consumers, but many more will enter into a
transaction with a particular software developer only once during any period of
time as would reasonably permit the evocation of this provision. 1
69
Finally, a "usage of trade" is "any practice or method of dealing having
such regularity of observance . . . as to justify an expectation that it will be ob-
served."'' 70  This "regularity of observance" requirement should not be inter-
preted to mean that any practice can become acceptable, provided that it goes
unchallenged for a certain period or number of times, or if a large enough num-
ber of dealers observe the practice. 17 1 All contracts or duties governed by the
U.C.C. require honesty and reasonably fair dealing, which cannot be dis-
claimed. 72  Moreover, where "an unconscionable or dishonest practice [be-
comes] standard," courts are permitted to police that practice "to the extent ne-
cessary to cope with the situation."'
' 73
These limitations on the usage of trade are compounded by the fact that
its purpose in being offered into evidence is to provide context to assist the court
in deciphering "the meaning of the parties' agreement," to give "particular
meaning to specific terms of the agreement," and to "supplement or qualify the
terms of the agreement"-not to legitimize waivers or modifications, which is
change in performance. Additionally, in order for one to be given the opportunity to accept the
performance or acquiesce without objection, it follows that some reasonable opportunity to object
was first given and later refused. However, the software developer's case may be made stronger
on this point where the software repeatedly updates itself via an internet connection, if the up-
date(s) provide a new opportunity for the developer to present the clickwrap terms and the terms
are conspicuously displayed to the user. Moreover, if the updates improve the existing software's
functionality, the subsequent clickwrap agreements are less likely to fail for want of consideration.
166 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
167 Although section 1-30 3(a)(2) of the U.C.C. allows for either acceptance or acquiescence
without objection, it still requires both "knowledge of the nature of performance" and the "oppor-
tunity for objection to it," which is simply not an option under most EULAs because to comply
with the terms, buyers are forced to either accept the new and conflicting terms or else return the
program: "this one or none." See supra note 155.
168 Id. § 1-303(b).
169 But see supra note 165.
170 Id. § 1-303(c).
17l Id. § 1-303 cmt. 4.
172 Id. §§ 1-302, 1-304.
173 Id. § 1-303 cmt. 5.
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reserved to course of performance. 174 Additionally, usage of trade is only impli-
cated "in the vocation or trade in which [both parties] are engaged or of which
they are or should be aware."'175 Definitionally, a consumer is not engaged in
the vocation or trade of dealing in software, and although a consumer may or
even "should" be aware of the developer's practice of "licensing" software as
opposed to "selling" it, far less presumable is the notion that the average con-
sumer is or should be aware that by using the product they have purchased they
are forfeiting virtually all of their legal (and perhaps constitutional) rights in the
event that the software proves defective, thereby causing damages.
Third, notwithstanding Judge Easterbrook's interpretation of its Official
Comments, 176 section 2-207 of the U.C.C. (often called the "battle of the
174 Id. § 1-303(d); 1-303(f) (formerly §§ 1-205 and 2-208). Given that the items addressed by
section 1-303 of the U.C.C. are all closely associated phrases, the drafters likely excluded "usage
of trade" from being relevant to proving waivers or modifications by deliberate choice, under the
canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius. However, Karl Llewellyn, the Chief Reporter of the
U.C.C., once pointed out that "[sitatutory interpretation ... speaks a diplomatic tongue," noting
that "there are two opposing canons on almost every point," while at the same time conceding that
"they are still needed tools of argument." Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395,
401 (1950). Regarding this canon, Llewellyn stated that its "thrust" could be "parried" with the
notion that statutory language "may fairly comprehend many different cases where some only are
expressly mentioned by way of example." Id. at 405. The originally approved language of the
U.C.C. stated that:
Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance by
either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity
for objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted without
objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement or to
show a waiver or modification of any term inconsistent with such course of
performance.
U.C.C. § 2-208 (1952) (emphasis added). The Comments go on to state that "[a] single occasion
of conduct does not fall within this section within the language of this section .... I Id. § 2-208
cmt. 4.
175 U.C.C. § 1-303(d).
176 Judge Easterbrook has been described "new textualist," a theory that "suggest[s] that it is
simply unconstitutional to consider anything that was not actually subject to the enactment
process" in discerning the meaning of statutes. LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 19-20 (2008) ("Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit has promoted a similar
agenda [to Supreme Court Justice Scalia's new textualist approach]."). As discussed infra note
189, the Official Comments to the U.C.C. have not been enacted in most states; therefore, it is
possible that Judge Easterbrook did not consult them in deciding ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86
F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996). However, because he did cite RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1981) and E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 1 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §
4.26 (1990) to support the legitimacy of adhesion contracts under Wisconsin law in ProCD (in the
context of interpreting Wisconsin's enacted version of Article 2 of the U.C.C.), neither of which
were subject to the enacting process of the Wisconsin legislature in adopting the U.C.C., it is clear
that Judge Easterbrook does indeed consider extrinsic sources in interpreting statutes, at least
when such sources further his desired outcome for a particular case. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451.
Because the Official Comments are far more persuasive in the interpretation of U.C.C. provisions
than the aforementioned sources on which Easterbrook relied, it is fair to state that he either did
consult or should have consulted the Comments prior to reaching his decision. Furthermore, in
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forms") prohibits the formation of the rolling, or layered contract, as the concept
relates to the typical shrinkwrap or clickwrap agreement. Because Judge Eas-
terbrook relied on a misunderstanding of the battle of the forms in ruling on two
of the leading cases upholding shrinkwraps as valid and enforceable, 177 a close
examination of section 2-207 of the U.C.C. is required. Section 2-207 permits
both additional and different terms to become part of an evolving bargain prior
to the "closing of the deal," and permits additional terms (only) to be added to
an existing contract. 78 Both scenarios are subject to certain limitations, as pre-
scribed under section 2-207(1)-(2). However, if an expression of acceptance is
both seasonable and definite, or is manifested by a written confirmation sent
within a reasonable time, the acceptance is valid under section 2-207(1) not-
withstanding its additional or different terms unless it expressly conditions its
enforceability on the offeror's assent to its new or different terms.' 79 This is
precisely what a shrinkwrap and clickwrap "agreement" is-a written confirma-
tion that states terms additional to or different from those agreed upon during
deciding a case under West Virginia law, there is no question that the Official Comments would
apply. See supra note 127.
177 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (The plaintiff's argument "pays
scant attention to the opinion in ProCD, which concluded that, when there is only one form, 'sec.
2-207 is irrelevant."' (quoting ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.)); ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 ("Our case has
only one form; UCC § 2-207 is irrelevant."). The drafters of the U.C.C. thought otherwise. "This
section is intended to deal with... [the situation] where an agreement has been reached ... and is
followed by one or both parties ... adding terms not discussed." U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1 (2000)
(emphasis added).
178 U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2. Some commentators attribute the absence of the words "or differ-
ent" in section 2-207(2) to a scrivener's error. See, e.g., John L. Utz, More on the Battle of the
Forms: The Treatment of "Different" Terms Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 UCC L.J.
103 (1983). Indeed, both Massachusetts and Montana have amended their enacted versions of §
2-207(2) to include the words "or different." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-207(2) (1991);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-207(2) (1983). Others believe this omission was intentional. See
JAMES J. WHIrrE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 32-36 (5th ed. 2000) (ar-
guing that "the text of § 2-207(2) only refers to 'additional' terms, and the drafters could have
easily inserted 'or different' if they had so intended") (footnote omitted). While admittedly, the
disappearance and reemergence of the word "different" in section 2-207 and the Comments that
follow at times resembles thimblerig, the approach advocated by Professors White and Summers
seems more plausible given that subsequent revisions of the (pre-2003) U.C.C. advanced by
NCCUSL and ALl have not changed section 2-207 to account for the omission and that any error,
if any, is neither clear nor obvious, whereas "[tlhe scrivener's error exception is a narrow one and
should not be used simply because the court believes an error might have been made." JELLUM,
supra note 176, at 75 (emphasis added). Furthermore, remarks made by Karl Llewellyn and Soia
Mentschikoff (Chief and Associate Chief Reporters of the U.C.C., respectively) during discus-
sions of the Proposed Final Draft No. 2 of the U.C.C. reveal that the drafters were well aware of
this omission and expressed reservations on whether the words were even necessary. See Douglas
G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of §
2-207, 68 VA. L. REv. 1217, 1240 n.61 (1982) (citing Transcript of Proceedings of the Annual
Meeting of the American Law Institute (ALl) in Joint Session with the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 27-28 (May 16-18, 1951)).
179 U.C.C. § 2-207(1).
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the sale (i.e., the implied warranty of merchantability), but is expressly condi-
tioned on the offeror's assent (here the consumer) to the additional or different
terms. This, the offeree (here the software developer) cannot do. In such a case,
the analysis under section 2-207 of the U.C.C. ends-if terms were previously
agreed upon, the original contract stands; if terms were merely offered, the "ac-
ceptance" expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different
terms is a counteroffer, and no contract is formed. Since, in a consumer soft-
ware transaction, the deal has already been "closed," section 2-207 of the
U.C.C. is no friend of the software developer.
180
Fourth, unlike the common law, the U.C.C. permits the modification of
a contract without consideration. However, good faith and legitimate commer-
cial reason are still required, as is mutual consent. Thus, both parties must agree
without coercion and they must actually be in "agreement," defined as "the bar-
gain of the parties in fact as found in their language or inferred... [by] course
of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade."' 8' It is axiomatic that a
modification cannot be unilateral: 182 "'I[m]odification or rescission' includes...
change by mutual consent ...it does not include unilateral 'termination' or
'cancellation.""1 83 Shrinkwrap and clickwrap terms demand consent under the
threat that the (already completed) sale, however narrowly defined it may be,
will be voided unilaterally. Thus, the Hobson's choice presented by the
shrinkwrap and clickwrap terms cannot be a bargain in fact between the parties,
notwithstanding the software industry's labeling the terms an "agreement."'
84
Nor can the course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade be ap-
plicable to most situations of the consumer variety. 85 As for the waiver provi-
sion of section 2-209(4), it is intended to prevent the statute of frauds from prec-
luding modification.186 This is generally not an issue in consumer software
transactions, because few amount to sales for the price of $500 or more.
87
Therefore, section 2-209 of the U.C.C. does not save the EULA.
180 Where the parties continue as if there were a contract, a constructive contract will manifest
under section 2-207(3) of the U.C.C.; however, U.C.C. "gap-fillers" (i.e., default provisions)
would replace to the conflicting terms-here, the warranty of merchantability. Id. § 2-314.
181 Id. § 1-201(3) (2004) (emphasis added).
182 An exception to this rule is a modification between merchants that comports with the re-
quirements of section 2-207(2) of the U.C.C.
183 Id. § 2-209 cmt. 3 (emphasis added).
184 See supra notes 89, 155 and accompanying text.
185 See supra notes 162-175 and accompanying text.
186 Id. § 2-209 cmt. 4.
187 Id. § 2-201(1). Note that if the software purchased is $500 or more, the consumer's case is
made even stronger. This is because the receipt is likely to qualify as a signed writing by the
retailer-the party against whom enforcement of the implied warranty is sought-because in-
cluded on the receipt would be the retailer's name and address, which most courts would consider
a "symbol executed or adopted with present intention to adopt or accept a writing." U.C.C. 1-
201(b)(37) (2004). Furthermore, as a party authorized to promote the sale of the software devel-
oper's product, under strict guidelines (such as prohibitions on separating "bundled" software, see
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Finally, the U.C.C. changes the common law rules of formation of con-
tracts significantly. For example, the legitimacy of rolling or layered contract-
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)), to the benefit of the developer, the
retailer's "signature" on the receipt binds the software developer as well (although the consumer
need not rely on principles of agency because under section 46A-6-108 of the West Virginia
Code, privity is abolished in an action by a consumer for breach of warranty or for negligence
with respect to goods, but see infra note 202 and accompanying text). W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-108
(1987). See also Dawson v. Canteen Corp., 212 S.E.2d 82, 82-83 (W. Va. 1975) ("[Tjhe re-
quirement of privity of contract in actions grounded in breach of express or implied warranty is
abolished in West Virginia."). However, no signed writing by the buyer would exist in relation to
the shrinkwrap or clickwrap agreement sufficient to satisfy section 2-201 (see infra this note), and
because the new agreement "as modified" would fall within the provisions of that section, the
EULA would not be enforceable as against the consumer. This is a consequence of the language
"a contract ... is not enforceable by way of action or defense." U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (emphasis
added). In such a situation, the consumer (as the party seeking to enforce the warranty of mer-
chantability) would be the plaintiff and the software developer would be the defendant. However,
the defendant would be the party asserting the existence of a contract (the shrinkwrap or clickwrap
agreement) as a defense to the breach of warranty claim; thus, the consumer would raise the sta-
tute of frauds as a defense to the EULA. Therefore, even if the court would otherwise find the
EULA valid and enforceable against the buyer, the statute of frauds defense would be available to
the consumer because no signed writing attributable to him or her would be available to evidence
the contract "as modified."
With regard to clickwrap agreements, it is arguable that the clicking of the "acceptance"
button satisfies the signature requirement under section 39A-1-7(d) of the West Virginia Uniform
Electronic Transaction Act. W. VA. CODE § 39A-1-7(d) (2001); see also W. VA. CODE § 39A-1-
2(8) (2001) (defining "electronic signature" as a "sound, symbol or process ... logically asso-
ciated with a record"). However, the writing requirement of section 2-201 of the U.C.C. is still
not satisfied because a writing must be in "tangible form." W. VA. CODE § 46-1-201(43) (2006).
Although the clickwrap terms themselves likely constitute a writing, unless the program itself
saves a record to the user's hard drive (or other retrievable location) after the user selects the
"acceptance" button with a recording of the process the individual actually undertook, the
"signed" record itself cannot be made "retrievable in perceivable form." W. VA. CODE § 46-1-
201(31). A mere inference that the user "signed" the writing, as evidenced by the fact that the
program was rendered fully executable, would likely be too great a stretch to fulfill this require-
ment. While the parol evidence rule would seem to be relevant here, as well as to the issue of
which terms are to be given effect in a EULA versus the underlying purchase generally, section 2-
202 explicitly limits the court's inquiry to the actual intent of the parties, not what the "reasona-
ble" buyer would have intended. U.C.C. § 2-202. Therefore, a buyer who can successfully argue
that they did not intend the EULA to be a "final expression of their agreement" may present parol
evidence to contradict the writing. Id. Additionally, a buyer may assert any of a number of con-
tract defenses, such as fraud or unconscionability, to achieve this result. See infra Parts IV.C.2-3.
With regard to agency principles, "[tihe principal cannot accept the benefits, without also
bearing the burdens, of the agent's acts." Syl., Lowance v. Johnson, 75 W.Va. 784, 84 S.E. 937
(W. Va. 1915). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 96 (1958) ("The purported prin-
cipal must take the transaction in its entirety, with the burdens as well as the benefits. He cannot
affirm a sale and disavow unauthorized representations or warranties which the purported agent
made to induce it."). As discussed supra note 5, a warranty of merchantability attaches to a sale
by certain types of merchants, unless otherwise agreed. Generally, the purchase of "canned"
software is not accompanied by any exclusion or modification of warranties by the merchant
seller. If the purchase of software from a retailer constitutes a "sale," to which the software de-
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ing is dependent on section 2-204 of the U.C.C. In M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v.
Timberline Software Corp., the Supreme Court of the State of Washington con-
cluded that "because [section 2-204] allows a contract to be formed 'in any
manner sufficient to show agreement.. . even though the moment of its making
is undetermined,' it allows the formation of 'layered contracts.' 188 In so hold-
ing, the court ignored the intent of Article 2's drafters, which is explained in the
Official Comment following the provision.1 89 The comment that follows section
2-204 of the U.C.C. clearly provides that the language "any manner sufficient to
show agreement" refers to the manner of expression of agreement, not its legal
effect, which is "qualified by other provisions of [the] Article."' 90 Thus, section
2-204(1) of the U.C.C. does not exist in a vacuum, and must be read in conjunc-
tion with other provisions of Article 2 of the U.C.C., some of which are dis-
cussed supra in this Part.
Furthermore, the language "even though the moment of its making is
undetermined" is "directed primarily to the situation where the interchanged
correspondence does not disclose the exact point at which the deal was
closed."'191 In the interchange between buyer and seller, the exact point at which
the deal is closed is obvious: when the seller accepts the buyer's offer, receives
the buyer's payment, and delivery is made.1 92 In the consumer software transac-
tion context, this typically occurs when the buyer selects a box in the store,
pays, is given a receipt, and is handed the box. If the software is purchased
188 998 P.2d 305, 313 (Wash. 2000) (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-204 (1999)). In Mor-
tenson, a construction company (Mortenson), relying on the defendant's bid analysis software to
prepare its bid to construct a medical center, submitted a bid generated by the software and was
awarded the contract to build. Id. at 309. However, the software malfunctioned and entered a bid
$1.95 million lower than Mortenson had intended. Id. An internal memorandum revealed that the
defendant was aware of the problem prior to Mortenson's bid, but chose to correct the problem
with only some of its customers. Id. Because Mortenson was the winning bid on the medical
center, it was forced to either build at a loss or be in breach of its contract. Relying on Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), and ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447, the court affirmed
the lower court's finding of summary judgment in favor of Timberline on account of the soft-
ware's shrinkwrap agreement. It should be noted that Mortenson might have been decided diffe-
rently had Mortenson been a consumer.
189 The Official Comments are not part of the statutes themselves; therefore, their text is highly
persuasive, but not mandatory. But see supra note 127. In Mortenson, 998 P.2d 305, because the
Washington court based its decision on the holdings of the Seventh Circuit (another persuasive,
but not mandatory source), it should have first consulted the Official Comments. See WHrTE &
SUMMERS, supra note 178, at 13-14 ("Besides the text itself, the Official Comments appended to
each section of the Code are by far the most useful aids to interpretation and construction .... In
some instances, the comments are sounder than the text; but disparity or no, most courts follow
the comments."). The flip side to this coin is that section 1-103(3) of the U.C.C. seeks "to make
uniform the law among the various jurisdictions." U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (2004). However, where a
court misconstrues the meaning of the Act, it is counterproductive to perpetuate incompetence in
the name of uniformity.
190 U.C.C. § 2-204 cmt.
191 Id.
192 Id. § 2-301.
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through mail-order, the sale is complete when the buyer's payment is accepted
and the seller puts the software "in the possession of . . .a carrier."' 93 If the
software is purchased electronically, the sale is complete when buyer's payment
is accepted and the software or the activation code is transmitted over the inter-
net. The "parties have intended to make a contract" at such point because tender
of delivery and tender of payment coalesce and "there is a reasonably certain
basis for giving an appropriate remedy."'' 94 Thus, the deal is closed; the pre-
sumption is that sales are final. The seller may choose to implement a return
policy for conforming goods, but this is at the seller's option.
Therefore, there are no avenues available to the software developer in
the common law or the U.C.C. under which to validate shrinkwrap or clickwrap
agreements as they relate to most consumer transactions. Notwithstanding this
reality, courts have a tendency to disregard the text in favor of expanding com-
mercial practices. At best, the latter approach should be applicable only in the
commercial context-where less bargaining disparity exists and the potential for
consequential damages is exponentially greater-rather than in that of the con-
sumer variety. 95 Although the U.C.C. aspires to promote the evolution of
commercial practices, such a position must be coupled with the concept of mu-
tuality; a contract borne of coercion is forged by duress, not agreement.
Layered or rolling contracts may be acceptable under the broad banner of pro-
moting commerce; however, such a finding will be made in spite of the text, not
as a result of it. Since this issue has yet to be litigated under West Virginia law,
this Note will next advance several approaches in the likely event that the West
Virginia courts entertain the idea that it is a "seller's market."
B. Implications of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act
on Software
Article 2 does not "impair .... any statute regulating sales to consum-
ers."'196 Furthermore, the Official Comments provide that "in a situation where
the other [conflicting] statute was specifically intended to provide additional
protection to a class ... the interrelationship between the statutes may lead the
court to conclude that the other statute is controlling."'197 Article 6 of the West
Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act regulates sales to consumers and
was promulgated to provide additional protection to the public from "unfair,
193 Id. § 2-504(a).
194 Id. § 2-204(3).
195 See supra text accompanying note 36.
196 W. VA. CODE § 46-2-102 (2008). See also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 178, at 8
("[F]ederal commercial law overrides the Code.... Similarly, state regulatory statutes also over-
ride the Code."); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 178, at 26 ("[B]oth Article 2 and the other sta-
tutes may apply, and when the two conflict, the other statutory law typically controls.").
197 U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 3 (2004).
[Vol. 111
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deceptive and fraudulent acts or practices." 198 Therefore, Article 2 as enacted
by the West Virginia legislature does not displace the West Virginia General
Consumer Protection statutes. 99 Of these, the provision prohibiting the dis-
claimer of warranties and remedies has the potential to impact shrinkwrap and
clickwrap agreements significantly, and is therefore the most important of the
consumer protection statutes with regard to such agreements. 200 Section 46A-6-
107 states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary with
respect to goods which are the subject of or are intended to be-
come the subject of a consumer transaction, no merchant shall.
. [e]xclude, modify or otherwise attempt to limit any warranty,
express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability
and fitness for a particular purpose; or ... [e]xclude, modify or
attempt to limit any remedy provided by law, including the
measure of damages available, for a breach of warranty, express
or implied. Any such exclusion, modification or attempted li-
mitation shall be void.2° '
Such a statute would seem to put the issue of shrinkwrap and clickwrap validity
to rest in the consumer context, at least as far as liability and warranty disclai-
mers are concerned.
However, the issue is still subject to debate because the statute defines
''consumer transaction" to mean "a sale or lease to a natural person or persons
for a personal, family, household or agricultural purpose., 20 2 The statute uses
"1sale" to mean "any sale, offer for sale or attempt to sell any goods for cash or
credit or any services or offer for services for cash or credit., 20 3 Under West
Virginia law, "[a] 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to the
buyer for a price. '' 204 Unless the parties explicitly agree to the contrary, "title
198 W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-101(1) (2008).
199 Id. § §46A-6-101 to -110 (2008).
200 See id. § 46A-6-107 (1974).
201 Id.
202 Id. § 46A-6-102(2) (2005). Note that because Article 2 of the U.C.C. governs transactions
in goods, such a distinction does not create the same limitation on applicability to software pur-
chases for the U.C.C. See supra Parts IC, IV.A. The original enactment of section 46A-6-102
did not define the term "consumer transaction," but section 46A-1-102 (the general definitions
section), defined "consumer" as "a natural person who incurs debt pursuant to a consumer credit
sale or a consumer loan." 1974 W. Va. Acts 64. The term "consumer transaction" was defined
the following year, and the definition of "consumer" was also added to section 46A-6-102, broa-
dening the definition of "consumer" in article six to "a natural person to whom a sale is made in a
consumer transaction." 1975 W. Va. Acts 291.
203 W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-102(5).
204 Id. § 46-2-106 (1963).
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passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller completes his per-
formance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods., 205 A seller may
convey no greater interest than is so possessed; hence, if a license is valid, the
seller can transfer no more than the license permits. Therefore, applicability of
section 46A-6-107 of the West Virginia Code to software is not entirely clear.
In enacting the statue, in subsection (1) of section 46A-6-101, the legis-
lature declared as its purpose "to protect the public and foster fair and honest
competition," and to that end "[the] article shall be liberally construed so that its
beneficial purposes may be served"; however, subsection (1) is counterpoised
by subsection (2), which proclaims that the article "shall not be construed to
prohibit acts or practices which are reasonable in relation to the development
and preservation of business or which are not injurious to the public interest. ' 2°
Although courts following the ProCD line of case law might view shrinkwrap
and clickwrap agreements as "reasonable in relation to the development and
preservation of business," whether West Virginia courts will agree or find such
agreements "injurious to the public interest" has yet to be determined.
There need not be such uncertainty, If the legislature intended section
46A-6-107 of the West Virginia Code to govern consumer software transac-
tions, the language of section 46A-6-102(2) of the West Virginia Code should
be amended to include "licenses" or "computer information agreements" to cla-
rify its applicability to software. It is not difficult to imagine the end run soft-
ware developers might effectuate against language limited to a "sale or lease."
If the legislature did not intend this provision to govern consumer software
transactions, it should reconsider. Shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements epi-
tomize the very practices that the General Consumer Protection statutes profess
as their raison d'6tre to suppress, in order to "protect the public and foster fair
and honest competition. 20 7 By including licenses in the definition of consumer
transactions, the legislature would be protecting consumers from "unfair compe-
tition and unfair, deceptive and fraudulent acts or practices, 20 8 while at the
same time, preserving the legitimate benefits that licensing affords software
developers: the ability to prevent arbitrage and limit liability in the commercial
setting. Likewise, consumers would be guaranteed at least the minimal protec-
tions of the implied warranty of merchantability and the right to recover for con-
tractual breach or in tort for damages caused by defective software.
C. Litigation Strategies Under West Virginia (and Federal) Law
The software industry has chosen to license its products through
shrinkwrap, clickwrap, and other arrangements rather than distribute software
205 Id. § 46-2-401(2) (2006).
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under traditional notions of sales. As previously discussed, legitimate justifica-
tions exist for the licensing of software. Although the issues surrounding this
practice have yet to be litigated in West Virginia, this section discusses several
strategies under West Virginia law to assist consumers in an attempt to reach an
appropriate equilibrium among competing interests. Despite the many problems
with shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements from the buyer's perspective, such
contracting methodology can be a legitimate approach to recognizing the unique
obstacles software developers confront in distributing their products to commer-
cial entities when drafted responsibly. Therefore, the following discussion pri-
marily concerns consumer transactions.
1. Choice of Law Provisions; Forum Selection and Arbitration
Clauses: Not Necessarily a Foregone Conclusion
The bulk of shrinkwrap and clickwrap litigation turns on forum selec-
tion and arbitration clauses.20 9 A choice of law provision is a separate matter
209 Forum selection and arbitration clauses are typically upheld as valid and enforceable. How-
ever, recent decisions indicate that the tide may be turning with regard to EULAs. Compare De-
John v. The .TV Corp. Int'l, 245 F. Supp. 2d 913, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (quoting Roby v. Corp. of
Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1363 (2d Cir.1993)) (Clickwrap agreement upheld as "reasonable" absent
a showing of: (1) fraud or overreaching, (2) that "the party will be deprived of his day in court as
a result of the 'grave inconvenience or unfairness of the selected forum,"' (3) that fundamental
unfairness of the chosen law may deprive the party of a remedy, or (4) that "the clause contra-
venes a strong public policy of the forum state," a mandatory clause is valid [hereinafter Bremen
Test]; plaintiff failed to invoke any such factor (quoting Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353,
1363 (2d Cir.1993))), Koresko v. RealNetworks, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1163 (E.D. Cal.
2003) (Clickwrap upheld despite plaintiff's claims of fraud, conversion, unjust enrichment, and
breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing; California resident not unduly burdened by
forum selection clause giving Washington exclusive jurisdiction.), AC Controls Co., Inc. v. Pome-
roy Computer Res., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 357, 361 (W.D. N.C. 2003) (Evidence that the plaintiff
successfully negotiated the modification of terms on the same document containing the forum
selection clause established the equally situated position of the parties.), 1-A Equip. Co. v. Icode,
Inc. 2003 WL 549913 (Mass. App. Div. opinion certified Feb. 21, 2003) (Court upheld
shrinkwrap agreement on ProCD's "fn]otice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to
return the software for a refund" rationale; plaintiff failed to establish that the forum selection
clause resulted from unequal bargaining power between the parties or was otherwise unfair, un-
reasonable, or affected by fraud.), and Gates v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 2003 WL 21375367 at
*2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 15, 2003) (Forum selection clauses are prima facie valid; TOS forum se-
lection clause upheld under the Bremen Test.), with Trujillo v. Apple Computer, Inc., 578
F.Supp.2d 979, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (EULA with service provider of Apple iPhone compelling
arbitration held unconscionable on the grounds that its terms came too late, buyer had reason to
believe that returning the phone would reduce his refund to cover a ten percent restocking fee, and
showing of substantive unconscionability not required under Illinois law upon showing of proce-
dural unconscionability concerning a "basic matter" of the contract.), Bragg v. Linden Research,
Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 611 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (Taken as a whole, the defendant's unilaterally
imposed clickwrap TOS held unenforceable on the grounds that it "tilt[ed] unfairly, in almost all
situations, in [the defendant's] favor" and its forum selection and arbitration provision would have
imposed greater costs on the plaintiff than litigating in state or federal court; held FAA did not
preclude state law unconscionability attack.), and Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 502 F. Supp. 2d
1061, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (Court held thai "California has a materially greater interest based on
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from a forum selection clause, but the two are often intertwined in license provi-
sions. A valid forum selection clause determines where a dispute will be liti-
gated or resolved; a valid choice of law provision determines which state's laws
will govern. With regard to the latter, West Virginia law unequivocally deems
any choice of law provision in a shrinkwrap or clickwrap agreement that seeks
to interpret the agreement pursuant to the laws of a state that has enacted
UCITA210 or any "substantially similar" law voidable if the party against whom
enforcement of the choice of law provision is sought is a West Virginia resident
or a company having its principal place of business in West Virginia. 21  In such
a case, the agreement will be interpreted pursuant to West Virginia law.
21 2
UCITA is the later incarnation of the proposed, but never adopted, Ar-
ticle 2B to the U.C.C. 21 3 Because UCITA presumes shrinkwrap and clickwrap
agreements to be valid,214 as well as other reasons regarded as unfavorable to
consumers, 21 5 it failed to pass in forty-eight of the fifty states. However, several
states have considered revised versions of UCITA, and NCCUSL is likely to
resurrect it in the future.21 6 Furthermore, several states have accomplished sub-
the fact that California residents are invoking California consumer protection laws to seek recov-
ery for allegedly defective products shipped into California" despite clickwrap forum selection
clause; court held that the consumer contract of adhesion established a minimal degree of proce-
dural unconscionability per se, while the class action waiver constituted a high degree of substan-
tive unconscionability; defendant's motion to compel arbitration denied.).
210 See supra note 18.
211 W. VA. CODE § 55-8-15 (2001).
212 Id.
213 See CLASSEN, supra note 18, at 155.
214 UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT (UCITA) § 208(2) (2002).
215 E.g., one of the more controversial aspects of UCITA was that it originally legalized the
practice of "self-help," which enabled a software developer to monitor a consumer's use of its
software via an internet connection or through internal mechanisms contained in the software. If,
in the sole discretion of the vendor, the user was deemed to have violated a term of the license, the
developer was entitled to terminate the user's software functionality remotely. This practice is
now limited to "a right of self-help to repossess the tangible copy without breach of peace." Id. §
815(b). However, a similar measure, known as "automatic restraint" is still sanctioned under the
Act. Automatic restraint is defined as "a program, code, device, or similar electronic or physical
limitation the intended purpose of which is to prevent use of information contrary to the contract."
Id. § 605(a). Therefore, a developer "is not liable for any loss caused by the use of the restraint to
prevent use of information contrary to the contract," although the practice is not to be used as a
remedy for breach. Id. § 605(d).
216 Currently, ALl is drafting a project entitled "Principles of the Law of Software Contracts"
("Principles") to govern "agreements for the transfer of software for a consideration." PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 1.06 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2008). The Principles are
not the law "unless and until a court adopts [them]. Courts can apply the Principles as definitive
rules, as a 'gloss' on the common law, U.C.C. Article 2, or other statutes, or not at all, as they see
fit." Id. at 3. It is too early to predict with a reasonable degree of certainty whether the Principles
will be adopted by the majority of jurisdictions or if they will suffer the same fate as earlier at-
tempts to handle software contracts. However, due to the modest approach taken by ALI and the
greater effort to take consumer rights into consideration, at least compared to previous attempts,
the Principles are likely to be persuasive to some courts.
[Vol. I111
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stantially similar results, such as Washington, through the case law. 17 There-
fore, if a choice of law provision is at issue, it may make sense for the party
seeking to have it voided advance the argument that the given state has enacted
laws that are substantially similar to UCITA or has adopted such rules through
its common law. Furthermore, West Virginia, like most states, has adopted the
2004 revisions to Article 1 of the U.C.C. generally, but has not adopted the 2004
proposed amendment to section 1-301. Therefore, where a consumer or busi-
ness entity purchases software under circumstances bearing a reasonable rela-
tion to West Virginia, the parties may agree to apply the law of another state
only where that state has a reasonable relation to the transaction as well.218 Ab-
sent such an agreement, West Virginia law governs the transaction. 2 19 The West
Virginia courts apply the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS sec-
tion 187(2) when "the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties
or the transaction, or when the application of the law of the chosen state would
be contrary to a fundamental public policy of the state whose law would apply
in the absence of a choice of laws provision. ,220 In such a case, "a choice of law
provision will not be given effect."22'
In West Virginia, forum selection clauses are not invalid per se.222 Fo-
rum selection clauses may determine which state has jurisdiction to hear the
case (if the matter is to be litigated) or, if arbitration or mediation is made man-
217 See M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000).
218 W. VA. CODE § 46-1-301(a) (2008).
219 Id. § 46-1-301(b).
220 General Elec. Co. v. Keyser, 275 S.E.2d 289, 293 (W.Va. 1981); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. B, illus. 3 (1971):
In state X, A buys from the B company a ticket on one of B's steamships for
transportation from X to state Y. The ticket recites that it shall be governed
by Y law and also contains a provision stating that B shall not be liable for in-
juries resulting from the negligence of its servants. The latter provision is va-
lid under Y local law, but invalid under that of X. In the course of the voyage,
A is injured through the negligence of B's servants. A brings suit to recover
for his injuries against B in state Z. In determining whether or not to give ef-
fect to the choice-of-law provision, the Z court will give consideration to the
fact that the contract was drafted unilaterally by B, the dominant party, and
then presented to A on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis.
221 General Elec. Co., 275 S.E.2d at 293.
222 In Caperton v. A.T Massey Coal Co., Inc., 2008 WL 918444 (Apr. 3, 2008), cert. granted
(on other grounds), 77 U.S.L.W. 3051, 77 U.S.L.W. 3292, 77 U.S.L.W. 3295 (Nov. 14, 2008)
(No. 08-22), WVSCA adopted the four-part analysis advanced by the Second Circuit in Phillips v.
Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 383-84 (2d Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Phillips Test]. Thus, a forum
selection clause is presumed enforceable where: (1) reasonably communicated to the resisting
party prior to entering the contract; (2) clear language specifies that jurisdiction is appropriate
only in a designated forum; (3) the claims and parties at issue fall within the scope of the clause;
and (4) enforcement is "reasonable." Caperton, 2008 WL 918444. West Virginia has adopted the
Bremen Test for reasonableness as set forth in Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1363 (2d
Cir. 1993), supra note 209.
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datory under the terms of the agreement, the clause may dictate the conditions
under which the dispute will be resolved. Mediators seek to lead the parties to
an agreement, but cannot compel one. Arbitrators, on the other hand, hear the
dispute and issue a binding decision, much like a judge. Unlike a judge, arbitra-
tors are not always bound by precedent or even the rule of law. Furthermore,
arbitrators often do not make their decisions public. Therefore, the party de-
manding arbitration may choose a sympathetic ear, in a location inconvenient to
the other party, while avoiding the negative publicity associated with litigation
when drafting the arbitration clause. As long as the terms are not "gravely in-
convenient" or "unreasonable, 223 the provision is likely to be found valid if
challenged in court. Although forum selection issues delve into contract-and
therefore state-law, contracts involving interstate commerce and containing an
arbitration provision fall under the aegis of federal law.
Generally speaking, arbitration clauses are governed by the Federal Ar-
224bitration Act (FAA), which declares that "[a] written provision in... a con-
tract... involving commerce to settle by arbitration ... shall be valid, irrevoca-
ble, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract., 225 In Bd. of Ed. of Berkeley County v. W. Harley
Miller, Inc., WVSCA held that in the absence of fraud, there is a rebuttable pre-
sumption that arbitration clauses are valid; however, the court held that "the
agreement to arbitrate must have been 'bargained for"' to be enforceable.226
Additionally, "[w]henever a party can bring an arbitration clause within the un-
conscionability provisions of § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code... then
that, too, would indicate that there was no meaningful bargaining with regard to
the arbitration provision and [the court] should invalidate it."'227 The Harley
Miller court carved out one other exception to the presumption in favor of
upholding arbitration clauses, holding that, "when arbitration is wholly inappro-
priate, given the nature of the contract, and could only have been intended to
defeat just claims, the provision cannot be considered to have been bargained
223 See Phillips Test and Bremen Test, supra notes 222 and 209, respectively.
224 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006). But see infra note 277 and accompanying text.
225 Id. § 2. In 2007, a bill was introduced in both houses of Congress that, if enacted, would
amend the FAA to invalidate pre-dispute arbitration agreements requiring the arbitration of con-
sumer disputes. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 1 10th Cong.; H.R. 3010, 110th Cong.
(2007). The definition of "consumer dispute" is broad enough to include EULAs. See S. 1782 §
3(6) (defining "consumer dispute" to include a dispute between an individual "who seeks or ac-
quires . . . personal property ... for personal, family, or household purposes and the seller or
provider of such property"). Although the bill did not pass during the previous session, it is likely
to be reintroduced in the lllth Congress. If reintroduced and enacted in its current form, the
amendments would "apply to any dispute or claim that arises on or after" the date of enactment.
Id. § 5.
226 236 S.E.2d 439, 486 (W.Va. 1977).
227 Id. at 486-87. Section 2-302 of the U.C.C. gives courts the discretion to alter or strike an
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for., 228 A decade later, in Perry v. Thomas, SCOTUS held that "state law,
whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable [to arbitration provisions]
if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and en-
forceability of contracts generally. 229 However, "[a] state law principle that
takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue
does not comport with the requirement of [the FAA] .230
In Schultz v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., the United States District
Court for the Northern District of West Virginia cited this language to invalidate
the decision in Harley Miller on the basis that "it was the intent of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia to specifically target arbitration agreements,
rather than contracts generally., 231 However, in State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger,
WVSCA held:
[T]he Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 2 [1947] does not
bar a state court that is examining exculpatory provisions in a
contract of adhesion that if applied would prohibit or substan-
tially limit a person from enforcing and vindicating rights and
protections or from seeking and obtaining statutory or common-
law relief and remedies that are afforded by or arise under state
law that exists for the benefit and protection of the public from
considering whether the provisions are unconscionable-merely
because the prohibiting or limiting provisions are part of or tied
to provisions in the contract relating to arbitration. 2
This is in accordance with the SCOTUS decision in Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v.
Casarotto, which held that "generally applicable contract defenses, such as
fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration
agreements without contravening [the FAA]. . . . Courts may not, however,
invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration
,,233provisions.. Notwithstanding Casarotto, the Schultz court, citing Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Coe,234 stated that the Dunlap decision
was "preempted by the FAA" on the grounds that the Dunlap decision imposes
heightened requirements on parties seeking to enforce arbitration provisions by
228 Harley Miller, 236 S.E.2d at 487.
229 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (emphasis in original).
230 Id.
231 376 F. Supp. 2d 685, 689 (N.D. W. Va. 2005).
232 State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 280 (W. Va. 2002).
233 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996) (emphasis in original).
234 313 F. Supp. 2d 603 (S.D. W. Va. 2004).
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"placing agreements to arbitrate ...on a different footing than other con-
tracts.,
235
2. Unconscionability: Not a Shockingly Original Strategy
In West Virginia, a contract will be held unconscionable "when the
'gross inadequacy in bargaining power' combines with 'terms unreasonably
favorable to the stronger party' . . . which in turn renders the contract unenfor-
ceable. 236 In determining whether a contract is unconscionable, a West Virgin-
ia court "must focus on the relative positions of the parties, the nature of the
entire contract, the adequacy of bargaining position, the meaningful alternatives
available to the appellant, and the existence of unfair terms in the contract.,
237
Finding, inter alia, in Dunlap, that the defendant willfully engaged in fraudulent
misconduct and sought to hide behind an arbitration provision, the court found
the contract unconscionable because it "deprived [every customer] of their right
to invoke and employ an important remedy provided by law to punish and deter
illegal, willful, and grossly negligent misconduct," and by enforcing the provi-
sion, the defendant "would be categorically shielded from any liability for such
sanctions, regardless of [its] level of wrongdoing.,
238
Based on the facts of the case, the Dunlap court properly applied the
West Virginia test for unconscionability, and in so ruling, the court did not eva-
luate the arbitration clause "on a different footing than other contracts., 239 The
contract in question was a nonnegotiated contract of adhesion, that if enforced
would have precluded any liability on the part of the defendant notwithstanding
its illegal acts, and although the contract at issue did not deprive the plaintiff of
all meaningful alternatives, several of the defendant's employees testified that
the defendant ordered them to conceal and lie about the terms when explaining
them to customers. Finding Chapter 46A of the West Virginia Code to be "spe-
cifically designed to eradicate unconscionability in consumer transactions," and
directly applicable to the formation of the contract at issue, the court held that
the contract was unconscionable under the circumstances.24 In so holding, the
court rejected the contract based on its result, not on its arbitration position. In
this regard, the Coe court was simply incorrect.24' While the holding in Schultz
235 Schultz, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 691 (quoting Coe, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 615). But see infra text
accompanying note 239.
236 State ex rel. Saylor v. Wilkes, 613 S.E.2d 914, 922 (W.Va. 2005) (quoting Troy Mining
Corp. v. Itmann Coal Co., 346 S.E.2d 749, 753 (W. Va. 1986)).
237 Art's Flower Shop, Inc. v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of W. Va., Inc., 413 S.E.2d
670, 675 (W.Va. 1991).
238 State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 278 (W. Va. 2002).
239 Id.
240 Id.
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may cloud the outcome of Dunlap, the Schultz decision cannot usurp the manda-
tory authority of Casarotto.242 Therefore, if a buyer can overcome the rebutta-
ble presumption that an arbitration clause is enforceable through the establish-
ment of "generally applicable contract defenses," the buyer can clear the first
hurdle in litigating his or her case against the enforceability of a shrinkwrap or
clickwrap agreement, and while establishing unconscionability is by far the
most common route pursued by litigants in such cases, asserting fraud, duress,
or misrepresentation may prove useful as additional routes to the courthouse.
3. Fraud, Duress, and Misrepresentation: Common Law Cures for
the FAA Blues
Courts may rescind a contract obtained from fraud or misrepresenta-
243tion. Likewise, "[i]t is a general principle that a transaction may be avoided
on account of duress and wrongful pressure. ' '244 All contracts require mutual
consent, which must be freely given and cannot be obtained by duress, fraud,
undue influence, or misrepresentation of a material fact.245 In West Virginia, to
prevail on a claim of fraud, the party seeking to assert it must show that the oth-
er party made one or more misrepresentations or withheld information, which it
knew or should have known, concerned a material fact on which the asserting
party justifiably relied and was damaged as a result.246 As illustrated in Part 11,
supra, license terms often contain provisions that appear to sanction fraud, such
as those that preclude liability even if the developer knows that their product is
defective. Obviously, a defect can arise to the requisite level of material suffi-
ciency, and while the burden of showing fraud is always on the party seeking to
assert it, fraud need not be proved by direct evidence. "If it satisfactorily ap-
pears from the circumstances shown, and from the conduct of the parties during
the sale and subsequent thereto, that [fraud] existed, such showing will be as
effective to set aside the sale as though proven by direct evidence., 247 Further-
more, "[c]ircumstances and transactions may be even stronger than direct proof
and furnish satisfactory proof of fraud that will outweigh the answers of defen-
dants and evidence of the witnesses.2 48 As for the defense of misrepresentation
against a claim that the consumer breached the EULA, few trades carry a greater
presumption of unreasonable nondisclosure-that is, where information is readi-
ly available to the seller but not the buyer-than the software industry.
242 Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
243 Tolley v. Poteet, 57 S.E. 811, 820 (W.Va. 1907) (citing Merchants' Bank v. Campbell, 75
Va. 455 (Va. 1881)).
244 First Nat. Bank of Peterstown v. Hansbarger, 40 S.E.2d 822, 826 (W. Va. 1946).
245 Crouch v. Wartenberg, 104 S.E. 117, 119 (W. Va. 1920). See also supra note 152 and ac-
companying text.
246 Syl. Pt. 3, Muzelak v. King Chevrolet, Inc., 368 S.E.2d 710 (W. Va. 1988).
247 Syl., Pendleton v. Letzkus, 114 S.E. 246 (W. Va. 1922).
248 Work v. Rogerson, 160 S.E.2d 159, 167 (W. Va. 1968).
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Fraud in the inducement has always been a deal breaker to contract ob-
ligation, rendering it voidable: "fraud vitiates all transactions. '249 ProCD held
that "[s]hrinkwrap licenses are enforceable unless their terms are objectionable
on grounds applicable to contracts in general (for example, if they violate a rule
of positive law, or if they are unconscionable). 25 ° Judge Easterbrook would
later come to regret those words . . . or at least ignore them. Hill proved that
Easterbrook could not be inconvenienced by such minor vexations as good faith
and honesty in fact in attainment of his desired result.
251
In Hill, the plaintiff purchased a Gateway computer advertised by the
defendant (Gateway) as having "Altec Lansing Surround Sound Speakers with
Subwoofer, a 6X EIDE CD-ROM Drive, and a Matrox MGA 'Millennium'
2MB Graphics Accelerator.', 252 Gateway proclaimed the CD-ROM drive to be
"the fastest EIDE CD-ROM anywhere." 253 Instead, what the consumer got was
a CD-ROM drive that repeatedly jammed and performed like a 4x speed drive,
notwithstanding the fact that a faster EIDE (Enhanced Integrated Device Elec-
tronics) CD-ROM drive than a 6x was available when Gateway made its claim;
the speakers were not surround sound, nor were surround sound speakers even
available from Gateway at the time (Gateway allegedly told the plaintiffs that
this part of the advertisement was a "misprint"); and the graphics accelerator
was "substituted" for a cheaper, less-powerful component without notice and
without a reduction in price.254 Despite these obvious breaches of express war-
ranties, nondisclosures, and fraud, Easterbrook found the shrinkwrap terms-
"buried within hundreds of pages of important documents," to which buyers had
no prior notice, and compelling arbitration with an advance fee of $2000-
valid.255 After all, what's a little fraud among grossly unequal bargainers?
4. A Brief Tour of the Magnuson-Mossery with Regard to EULAS
The federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 256 (MMWA), inter alia, vo-
ids any attempt by a merchant (as to goods of the kind at issue) to disclaim or
modify the warranty of merchantability 257in "consumer products '258 for the du-
249 Swayze's Lessee v. Burke, 37 U.S. 11 (1838) (quoting Fermor v. Smith, 3 Rep. 77 (1602)).
250 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
251 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
252 1996 WL 650631, at *1 (N.D. 1I. Nov. 7, 1996).
253 Id.
254 Id. at *1-*2.
255 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 5, Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 522 U.S. 808 (1997) (No.
96-1760), 1997 WL 33561488.
256 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1975).
257 Except in Louisiana, where a sale implies a warranty against redhibitory defects. LA. CIv.
CODE ANN. art. 2520 (1995).
[Vol. I111
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ration of a "written warranty. ' 259 The coverage period of the written warranty
may be limited by the seller or manufacturer according to its terms, but it must
extend for a reasonable duration.2 60 Although federal law, MMWA allows con-
sumers to litigate claims in state court if the amount in controversy is less than
$50,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 261 Alternatively, if the consumer wish-
es to pursue an implied or express warranty claim arising under state law in fed-
eral court, MMWA sets the minimum pleading amount at $50,000.62 Such a
claim may be brought regardless as to whether the buyer gave the warrantor
adequate notice of breach, notwithstanding the notice requirement imposed on
the buyer by the U.C.C., so long as the warrantor was given a reasonable oppor-
263tunity to cure. 6 MMWA supplies an additional count to breach of warranty
claims; other remedial action may be pursued as well.264
Including an MMWA count in the complaint can provide a number of
benefits, such as recovery of ligation costs (including attorney's fees) to prevail-
ing consumers; 265 however, MMWA's application to software EULAS presents
several complications.266  First, MMWA applies only to tangible property,267
although the purpose of imposing this restriction was to preclude MMWA cov-
258 MMWA defines "consumer product" as "any tangible personal property ... distributed in
commerce and ... normally used for personal, family, or household purposes." 15 U.S.C. §
2301(1) (1975) (emphasis added).
259 Id. § 2308(a) (1975). A "written warranty" is defined, in pertinent part, as:
[A]ny undertaking in writing in connection with the sale.., to refund, repair,
replace, or take other remedial action with respect to the product ... which...
becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer for
purposes other than resale of such product.
Id. § 2301(6)(B). An MMWA count can be added to a breach of implied warranty claim even
though no written warranty is given, so long as the implied warranty is not otherwise excluded or
modified. Id. § 2310(d)(1) (1975). There is a presumption that a written warranty under MMWA
is part of the basis of the bargain, notwithstanding its lack of inclusion in the negotiation. See
Murphy v. Mallard Coach Co., 582 N.Y.S.2d 528, 531 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (Rejecting defen-
dant's argument that to be part of the basis of the bargain the warranty must be part of the negotia-
tion process. "[T]he warranty card generally comes with the goods, [but is] not available to be
read by the consumer until after the item is actually purchased and brought home .... [Defen-
dant's] interpretation would, in effect, render almost all consumer warranties an absolute nulli-
ty.").
260 Id. § 2308(b) (emphasis added).
261 Id. § 2310(d)(l)-(3).
262 Id.
263 U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (2000).
264 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(1) (1975).
265 Id. § 2310(d)(2).
266 See CLASSEN, supra note 18, at 53. The issue of whether MMWA is applicable to software
has yet to be adjudicated and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has not issued a rulemaking
on the matter. Id. at 53 n.2. The case is stronger for hardware sold with preinstalled software, but
a consumer adopting this approach must be willing to concede the legitimacy of the EULA.
267 See supra notes 53-67, and text accompanying notes 118-122.
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erage from realty. 268 MMWA has not been amended since its enactment in
1975.269 Because computers were not affordable or practical to consumers at
that time, nor had EULA litigation come into existence in the consumer soft-
ware context, it is likely that this limitation was not intended to preclude soft-
ware from the reach of MMWA. After all, MMWA was "designed to... re-
dress the ill effects resulting from the imbalance which presently exists in the
relative bargaining power of consumers and suppliers of consumer products"
and address "[t]he need for minimum warranty protection for consumers" to
"insure consumers have certain basic protections." 270 Few products-if any-
offer so little to the consumer in terms of "minimum warranty protection."
Second, the safeguarding provisions of MMWA are predicated on the concept
of its broadly defined "written warranty." Although some EULAs might fall
within MMWA's definition of written warranty (or "service contract"),271 others
create illusory undertakings of remedial action at best.272 Finally, both defini-
tions of "written warranty" are limited to those made in connection with a sale
of a consumer product.2 73 In Apple's case at least, "[y]ou own the media on
which the Apple Software is recorded but Apple and/or Apple's licensor(s) re-
tain ownership of the Apple Software itself'; 274 thus, there is clearly a sale of the
media, bringing it squarely into the purview of MMWA.
Consequently, the software developer cannot disclaim any implied war-
ranty, provided the consumer establishes that: (1) a sale occurred, (2) the written
warranty became part of the basis of the bargain, and (3) the software falls with-
in the meaning of "consumer product., 275 If the consumer is able to establish all
three, a EULA purporting to disclaim any implied warranty, by its own terms,
will be in violation of the Act, and a consumer who is harmed by the violation
"may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief., 276 This cause
of action is available to consumers irrespective of any written promise or affir-
mation made in connection with the sale conditioned upon submission to arbi-
268 See S. REP. No. 93-151, at 11 (1973) ("The term 'consumer product' is limited to tangible
personal property, not realty.... To the extent that there is any necessary ambiguity in the term
'consumer product,' the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of coverage.").
269 However, the FTC is granted the authority to promulgate rules and issue statements govem-
ing the Act. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 700-703 (2008). But see supra note 266.
270 Id. at 6-7.
271 See supra text accompanying note 101.
272 See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
273 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(A)-(B) (1975).
274 See APPLE, MAC OS, supra note 72, at 1.
275 15 U.S.C. § 2301. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
276 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (1975). Most canned software makes certain representations of
functionality and reference to the EULA terms on the outside packaging. Because any written
warranty provided requires the implied warranties to continue for a reasonable duration, the buyer
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tration.27 Thus, the consumer will not be bound by the result of the software
developer's attempts to force arbitration through its EULA.
5. The U.C.C.'s Balancing Act
If Article 2 is held to be applicable to software transactions, section 2-
719(3) of the U.C.C. should be applied where the buyer is a consumer. West
Virginia has enacted this provision as section 46-2-719(3) of the West Virginia
Code, which states that "[c]onsequential damages may be limited or excluded
unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequen-
tial damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima
facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is
not." This provision of the U.C.C. effectively voids personal injury liability
disclaimers when the buyer is a consumer. In addition, it allows the court some
flexibility in determining whether a commercial user should be permitted to
recover, and if so, how much that user is entitled to receive. Under section 46-
2-302 of the West Virginia Code, the court may, in its discretion, refuse to en-
force the contract in its entirety, void the unconscionable clause, or simply "lim-
it the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result." 178 Therefore, the consumer is protected from the worst type of product
defect: physical harm, while the software developer is shielded from the far-
reaching threat of unreasonable consequential damages in the commercial set-
ting. 9
V. CONCLUSION
Computer software licensing is likely to remain a permanent fixture to
the corpus of contract law. It is only a matter of time before the West Virginia
courts are confronted by the issue of whether to uphold the validity of
shrinkwrap, clickwrap, and similar additions to previously formed agreements.
For decades, consumer protection statues have been successful in reducing the
number of buyers falling prey to unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent practices, but
with the advent of new technology comes a host of new opportunities for con-
sumers to be exploited. Until the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protec-
tion Act is updated to clearly include software transactions, or WVSCA rules on
277 See, e.g., Koons Ford of Baltimore, Inc. v. Lobach, 919 A.2d 722, 737 (Md. 2007) (holding
that "Congress did not intend for consumers to be forced to resolve their MMWA claims through
binding arbitration"). Although a consumer might be required to participate in arbitration, the
result will not be binding where the statute is properly applied, as intended by the 93rd Congress.
278 W. VA. CODE § 46-2-302(1) (1963).
279 Contrary to common belief, software defects have in fact been responsible for loss of life.
E.g., in the mid-1980s, a glitch in the software running the Therac-25 radiation therapy device
created by Atomic Energy of Canada caused massive overdose to six people, "all died or were
seriously injured." NANCY G. LEVESON, SAFEWARE: SYSTEM SAFETY AND COMPUTERS 3 (1995).
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the matter, there can be no assurance that the public will be adequately protected
from fraudulent or shoddy software products. Unlike buyers in earlier times,
today's consumer stands to bear losses far beyond the purchase price paid. De-
fective software products have been known to cause loss of data, harm to person
and property, and reduced confidence in the market, having economic repercus-
sions to buyers and sellers alike. Additionally, clandestine data siphoning from
software developers to anonymous third-party developers increases the potential
for identity theft and credit problems for the consumer. Finally, the delayed
disclosure of shrinkwrap and clickwrap terms without an opportunity to reject
them, short of voiding the sale, diminishes the fundamental principles of con-
tract law that have formed the basis of bargains for centuries.
The West Virginia Legislature should amend section 46A-6-102(2) to
include the term "license" or "computer information agreement" in order to se-
cure its applicability to software. Alternatively, the courts should look to Ar-
ticle 2 of the U.C.C. to govern software and apply it as part of a cohesive, com-
prehensive approach to compliment the breadth of West Virginia law, not as
piecemeal provisions arbitrarily administered by analogy. Software developers
have a legitimate purpose in choosing to license their products rather than sell-
ing them outright, which in turn reduces costs to the consumer, but in doing so,
new costs are borne by the individual and society. The brunt of this contractual
coercion can be allayed by enforcing the warranty of merchantability in con-
sumer purchases of software. In West Virginia, "the freedom to contract is a
substantial public policy that should not be lightly dismissed, 280 but freedom of
contract is not without limits. When consumers of commercial software prod-
ucts look into the "poke" to reveal their purchase, will the animal that escapes
be a reflection of their bargain or an unfair surprise? The answer will turn on
whether West Virginia's courts interpret the Uniform Commercial Code as a
promoter of agreement or as an apparatus of abuse.
David R. Collins*
280 Wellington Power Corp. v. CNA Surety Corp., 614 S.E.2d 680, 685 (W. Va. 2005).
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